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Taking UCITA on the Road:
What Lessons Have We Learned?
Amelia H. Boss*
INTRODUCTION
In 1999, with a great deal of fanfare, the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws completed its work on a
new statute designed to bring the Conference-and state law-into
the new millennium: the Uniform Computer Information Transac-
tions Act or UCITA. Two years and two state enactments later,
there are those who argue that UCITA should be the model not
only for this country, but for other countries-and regional and in-
ternational policy makers-to adopt.
Should UCITA be an international model? The answer to that
question is both "yes" and "no." If one speaks of UCITA as a con-
cept-the concept that there is a need to address a type of transac-
tion whose use is increasing exponentially in importance in today's
economy-the transfer of information by contract-then the an-
swer is yes. If one views UCITA as standing for the proposition
that a comprehensive and accessible body of law covering informa-
tion contracts would add the predictability and certainty desired
by those engaged extensively in electronic commerce, the answer is
yes. And if one views UCITA as a "checklist" of issues that must be
confronted in efforts to deal with new information-based transac-
tions (whether those efforts are those of a practitioner in drafting a
license or a legislator determining what issues to address next),
the answer is again yes.
Unfortunately, however, if one views UCITA as a specific body
of law, to be enacted substantially as is with little reevaluation,
reexamination and reassessment of its provisions (especially in the
international context), then the answer is no. My involvement in
* Charles Klein Professor of Law, Temple University James E. Beasley
School of Law.
168 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:167
the drafting of UCITA for over fourteen years-from the inception
of the idea until almost the end'-has undoubtedly influenced both
of my responses to the main question.
It has also convinced me that the nature of the debate sur-
rounding UCITA needs to change. Over the two years since
UCITA was promulgated by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws, and indeed dating from before its
enactment, there has been extensive opposition to the project.2
Opponents of the legislation have raised concerns over the adop-
tion process (some concerns meritorious, others mere reiterations
of concerns without basis or repetition of old concerns since proven
wrong), and in the bulk of states to date, that opposition has led to
the failure of UCITA to successfully navigate the state legislative
process or, in some cases, has led to enactment of anti-UCITA leg-
islation.3 In the process, proponents of the legislation have tried to
negotiate compromises, asking opponents to identify those provi-
sions on which there is disagreement to see whether concerns
could be addressed. 4 Thus, the debate has centered on whether to
1. I chaired the Ad Hoc Committee on Scope of the Uniform Commercial
Code of the American Bar Association's Section of Business Law, Uniform Com-
mercial Code Committee, and in 1985 helped launch the initial study on software
contracting under the UCC. That group ultimately produced a report recom-
mending statutory treatment of software contracts, at which point I began working
with the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NC-
CUSL) to study the potential of this new project. When the Conference (along with
its sister organization, the American Law Institute) approved the creation of a
Drafting Committee on software contracting, I was appointed to that committee as
the American Law Institute representative and similarly served on the Drafting
Committee to revise Uniform Commercial Code Article 2. When the decision was
made to split information/software licensing off from Article 2, I continued on the
Article 2 Drafting Committee and also served as the American Law Institute mem-
ber of the Drafting Committee on Article 2B Licensing. I served in that capacity
until the Spring of 1999, when the American Law Institute withdrew from the
process, and the project was retitled the "Uniform Computer Information Transac-
tions Act" (UCITA). At that time, I was asked to continue as an advisor on the
project, but declined to do so. Three months later the National Conference com-
pleted its work on UCITA. The complete text of the Act is available at http:/
www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/ucitsFinal00.htm. This article reflects develop-
ments through August 2001.
2. See infra notes 18-28 and accompanying text. For a sampling of the depth
and breadth of the opposition, see http://www.4cite.org (last visited Nov. 10, 2001)
and http://www.badsoftware.com (last visited Nov. 10, 2001).
3. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
4. This led to the drafting of amendments to UCITA, but not to any extensive
revisions. The NCCUSL approved amendments to UCITA in 2000 and 2001, mak-
ing minor changes to section 103 (excluding motion picture industry), section 216
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enact UCITA as a whole, enact it with minor amendments, or (at
the other extreme) kill the legislation.
The time has come to reevaluate UCITA. It does not make
sense to ask what amendments to isolated provisions might make
it "sell" to different constituencies. UCITA contains a number of
controversial provisions on which consensus can never be achieved,
and the opposition will remain.5 Although it is undoubtedly possi-
ble to enact a law about which there is some controversy, the fact
that UCITA contains so many controversial provisions compounds
the difficulties of enactment. Rather than focusing on the contro-
versial provisions and how they can be amended to satisfy the op-
ponents, the focus might better be placed on what positive can be
gleaned and saved from UCITA.
UCITA stands as a potential roadmap outlining the issues of
importance for future development, debate and resolution; guiding
developments in other venues (such as international law-making
venues); or identifying those points on which there is sufficient
agreement that legislative enactment of those provisions could be
achieved. UCITA was (and is) an extremely ambitious project that
invites and merits intense scrutiny and study. Such a detailed
analysis, however, is beyond the scope of this much more limited
endeavor-to permit someone who was at many stages deeply in-
volved in the process the luxury of ruminating over what has tran-
spired. I am one who believes that the lessons to be learned from
UCITA (and the process by which it was drafted) are worth far
more than its provisions themselves. These lessons may prove ex-
(adding idea submission provisions) and section 816 (clarifying limitations on self-
help). See Amendments to the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
(ratified Aug. 4, 2000), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/
ucitaAMD.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2001); Amendments to Sections 605 and 816 of
the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (as Last Revised in 2000),
available at http://www.ucitaonline.com/docsI0101a.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2001);
Amendments Approved by NCCUSL Executive Committee Pending Ratification of
the Conference (Feb. 2000), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/ap-
proveamend.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2001).
5. An example of this may be § 209, the choice of law provisions. There has
been an inability to reach consensus on them in other fora such as the Hague Con-
ference on Private International Law. See Paul Hofheinz, Birth Pangs For Web
Treaty Seem Endless, Wall St. J., Aug. 16, 2001, at All. In UCITA, the real prob-
lem comes from the bundling together of many controversial issues such as this
into one package.
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tremely valuable to those who toil in the field of legislative reform,
both domestically and internationally.
I. A BIT OF BACKGROUND
Over the last ten years, our economic marketplace has dra-
matically changed in many significant ways.6 With the advent of
the Internet and the rise of computer technologies generally, we
have witnessed the commoditization of information: information it-
self has become the subject of commercial transactions, not just the
medium for performing them. This is, in essence, a key feature of
our emerging information economy. Business can now be con-
ducted at lightning speed between parties at great distances from
one another; national boundaries and cultural differences are both
invisible. There have been increasing demands on the law, devel-
oped in the context of different transactions, to catch up and adapt
to these new transactions; cries for clarity, certainty, and interna-
tional uniformity abound.7 Uniformity eliminates the "jurisdic-
tional risk" of non-uniform law in cross-border activities, which is
particularly a problem in Internet transactions. A contractual
code, it is argued, will facilitate information exchange; codification
lowers negotiation costs by supplying off-the-shelf terms parties
6. See, e.g., Neil B. Cohen, Introduction to Symposium, Software as a Com-
modity: International Licensing of Intellectual Property, 26 Brook. J. Intl L. 3
(2000). For an interesting analysis of how technology has transformed society over
a longer period, see M. Ethan Katsh, The Electronic Media and the Transforma-
tion of Law (1989).
7. See, e.g., William J. Clinton & Albert Gore, Jr., A Framework for Global
Electronic Commerce (1997), available at http://www.iitf.nist.gov/eleccomm/
ecomm.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2001) [hereinafter Clinton & Gore, Framework].
Many businesses and consumers are still wary of conducting extensive
business over the Internet because of the lack of a predictable legal envi-
ronment governing transactions. This is particularly true for interna-
tional commercial activity where concerns about enforcement of contracts,
liability, intellectual property protection, privacy, security and other mat-
ters have caused businesses and consumers to be cautious.
Id. The White House report noted the work being done by the United Nations and
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in developing
rules governing electronic documents and signatures, and observed:
The United States Government supports the adoption of principles along
these lines by all nations as a start to defining an international set of uni-
form commercial principles for electronic commerce. We urge UNCITRAL,
other appropriate international bodies, bar associations, and other private
sector groups to continue their work in this area.
Id. (emphasis added).
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can adopt, filling gaps if they cannot agree and providing the back-
drop against which negotiations occur.8
It is against this background that UCITA was drafted. The
drafting history of UCITA has been described at length elsewhere. 9
Nonetheless, a few critical aspects of that history bear repeating.
First, the concept of statutory treatment of software transac-
tions originally surfaced over fifteen years ago as commercial law-
yers grappled with judicial attempts to apply the goods provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code to software.' 0 At the outset, the
issues and the discourse were framed from a commercial perspec-
tive, focusing on contracting issues such as warranties and reme-
dies in the software context; only later in the process (as more and
more software and information industry representatives became
involved) did the focus shift from the potential of a new software
contracting statute to more expansive treatment of information
8. See, e.g., Mary Jo Howard Dively & Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., Overview of Uni-
form Computer Information Transactions Act, in Advanced Licensing Agreements
for the New Economy 2001, 201 (P.L.I. ed., 2001); Jeff C. Dodd, Time and Assent in
the Formation of Information Contracts: The Mischief of Applying Article 2 to Infor-
mation Contracts, 36 Hous. L. Rev. 195 (1999); Philip M. Nichols, Electronic Uncer-
tainty Within the International Trade Regime, 15 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 1379 (2000).
9. There has been an exceptional amount of literature devoted to UCITA. At
least two law review symposia issues have dealt with the topic. Symposium, Li-
censing in the Digital Age, 36 Hous. L. Rev. 1 (1999); Symposium, Approaching E-
Commerce Through Uniform Legislation: Understanding the Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act and the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, 38
Duq. L. Rev. 205 (Winter 2000). See, e.g., Raymond T. Nimmer, Images and Con-
tract Law-What Law Applies to Transactions in Information, 36 Hous. L. Rev. 1
(1999) [hereinafter Nimmer, Images]; Raymond T. Nimmer, Through the Looking
Glass: What Courts and UCITA Say about the Scope of Contract Law in the Infor-
mation Age, 38 Duq. L. Rev. 255 (2000) [hereinafter Nimmer, Looking Glass]; Ray-
mond T. Nimmer & Holly K. Towle, UCC Article 2B Would Govern Software
Licensing, Natl L.J., Feb. 12, 1996, at C2; Holly K. Towle, Mass Market Transac-
tions in the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 38 Duq. L. Rev. 371
(2000); Holly K. Towle, The Politics of Licensing Law, 36 Hous. L. Rev. 121 (1999).
10. The concept of a statute devoted to software arose out of the work of an Ad
Hoc Subcommittee on the Scope of the Uniform Commercial Code Committee of
the American Bar Association and was first discussed in print in 1988. See Amelia
H. Boss & William J. Woodward, Jr., Scope of the Uniform Commercial Code: Sur-
vey of Computer Contracting Cases, 43 Bus. Law. 1513 (1988); Amelia H. Boss et
al., Scope of the Uniform Commercial Code; Advances in Technology and Survey of
Computer Contracting Cases, 44 Bus. Law. 1671 (1989); Jeffrey B. Ritter, Scope of
The Uniform Commercial Code: Computer Contracting Cases and Electronic Com-
mercial Practices, 45 Bus. Law. 2533 (1990).
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and additional protections for licensors of information." This
evolution-from contract issues to information policy issues-in-
creased the visibility of the product. Moreover, it significantly ad-
ded to the complexity of the project and the number of economic
interests affected by the proposal, making consensus on such a
statute harder to achieve and contributing to the growing dissatis-
faction with its provisions.
Second, the efforts to address software contracts were initially
combined with other efforts to revise domestic sales law-a recog-
nition that in the generic area of contracting, there was a great
deal of overlap between contracts for the transfer of goods and con-
tracts for the transfer of information. 12 Although it was acknowl-
edged that certain aspects of information contracts might require
different provisions, the similarities were deemed sufficient
enough, at the outset, to justify a core set of provisions ("hub" prin-
11. This shift occurred during the period when the use of licensing to govern
and restrict the use of information gained importance and visibility as courts and
Congress refused to grant copyright protection to information such as databases.
The prominence of licensing also illustrated the desire of licensors to place addi-
tional restrictions on the use of copyrighted information not otherwise granted by
copyright law. See David A. Rice, Legal-Technological Regulation of Information
Access, in Libraries, Museums, and Archives: Legal Issues and Ethical Challenges
in the New Information Era 275 (Tomas A. Lipinski, ed. 2002). A second signifi-
cant development occurred during this period that profoundly affected the sub-
stance of the UCITA discussions. Although early cases, such as Vault Corp. v.
Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) and Step-Saver Data Sys. v. Wyse
Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991), cast significant doubt on the enforceability of
licenses in the software context, two significant cases from the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir.1996), and Hill v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 808 (1997),
upheld this method of contracting. This development permitted the software in-
dustry, in particular, to refocus its efforts on what it hoped to achieve from the
UCITA drafting process.
12. From 1991 to 1995, the Drafting Committee to revise Article 2 considered
not only the substance of the goods provisions, but also the question of whether to
deal with software in the context of Article 2-in what was dubbed as a "hub-and-
spoke" approach-or in a separate statute (whether or not a part of the UCC). See
Linda J. Rusch, A History and Perspective of Revised Article 2: The Never Ending
Saga of a Search for Balance, 52 SMU L. Rev. 1683, 1715 (1999); Richard E. Spei-
del, Introduction to Symposium on Proposed Revised Article 2, 54 SMU L. Rev. 787
(2001) [hereinafter Speidel, Symposium Intro]; Richard E. Speidel, Revising UCC
Article 2: A View From the Trenches, 52 Hastings L.J. 607 (2001) [hereinafter Spei-
del, Trenches]. Folding the discussions of how to treat software licensing into the
ongoing Article 2 sale of goods revision process was an implicit recognition of the
substantial overlap between the substantive rules governing each type of
transaction.
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ciples) governing both goods and information contracts, with spe-
cial rules ("spoke" rules) necessary to deal with the unique aspects
of each. 13 This recognition (that there are similarities as well as
differences between information and goods contracts) is frequently
overlooked in the literature proclaiming the need for an entirely
separate body of information law.14
Third, the critical decision to separate goods from software
and information during the drafting process was not, as some have
portrayed, the result of a determination that contract issues sur-
rounding the licensing of information were so distinct from those
involving the sale of goods that a different body of rules were re-
quired. By 1995, the drafting committee originally charged with
responsibility in the field was prepared to recommend a "hub-and-
spoke" treatment for goods and information. A central core of basic
contracting principles governing all transactions (sales, leases, li-
censes and possibly other transactions such as services) would be
combined with specific rules where needed. Nonetheless, in 1995
the leadership of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws made the surprising announcement that it
was abandoning attempts to treat software within Article 2, and
was instead creating a new Drafting Committee (the Article 2B
Drafting Committee) with a new reporter to draft a new statute on
the licensing of information.15 This split was not justified on the
grounds that information and software were significantly different,
13. Under the proposed "hub-and-spoke" approach, the core contracting prin-
ciples would apply to every transaction: sales (existing Article 2); leases (existing
Article 2A) and software licenses. Potentially, they could also apply to other types
of contracts, such as services contracts. These core principles would be followed by
"spokes" setting forth specific rules for the particular transaction at hand.
14. See, e.g., Nimmer, Looking Glass, supra note 9. Professor Nimmer exam-
ines the cases struggling with which law (Article 2 or common law) to apply to
information transactions, but often fails to examine why the question is important.
Asking whether the licensing of information is the same as, or different from, the
sale of goods is the same as asking "is the glass half empty or half full." The an-
swer is "it depends." If one is in need of a drink, the salient fact is that there is
something in the glass (it is half full); if the question is whether to refill the glass,
the salient fact is that it is half empty. In the context of UCITA, the question is not
whether licensing of information is different than sales of goods, but whether those
differences in the transactions justify a difference in the applicable legal rule.
15. It is noteworthy that this important step was taken by the leadership of
the NCCUSL with minimal input from its partner in the Code revision process, the
American Law Institute, and with minimal input from the Chair, Reporter or
Drafting Committee on Article 2. For a diplomatic account of the failure of the
hub-and-spoke approach, see Speidel, Trenches, supra note 12, at 612-15.
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but rather on the basis that the logistics of restructuring Article 2
into a hub with spokes would require extraordinary time and
resources.
My perception is that an additional, unarticulated motive was
surely behind this surprising decision. As long as sales and
software were being handled by the same Drafting Committee, de-
cisions on fundamental issues-such as the treatment of adhesion
contracts, the nature of assent, the role of formalities in contract,
the availability of damages-would be the same. Yet pressure was
being placed on the Conference by the software industry, which
primarily represents the interests of licensors and was uncomfort-
able with what it perceived as the liberal "pro-buyer" or "pro-con-
sumer" positions being advanced in the context of Article 2.16
Thus, splitting off the two committees allowed for the development
of the licensing law in a different direction than the sales article.
In attempts following the creation of the Article 2B Drafting Com-
mittee to coordinate the two drafts, both the degree of divergence
between the two and their fundamentally different approaches to
contract law became apparent. 17
Fourth, UCITA in the United States has not been met with
total acceptance-it has been enacted in only two states to date.
Indeed, one might characterize its reception in some quarters as
down right hostile. For example, the attorneys general in many
states opposed the original adoption of UCITA by the National
Conference.' 8 In addition to lobbying against enactment of UCITA
by states, opponents have actually gone on the offensive and urged
state legislatures to adopt legislation that would affirmatively pre-
16. Id.
17. One of the key results of the split is that the Article 2 Drafting Committee
was under increased pressure-in the name of "uniformity"-to revise its provi-
sions to follow the more conservative ones in Article 2B. This impact was felt in
such areas as the Statute of Frauds (which the Article 2 drafting committee origi-
nally voted to eliminate but which was vigorously defended by the Article 2B com-
mittee; it was later reinstated in Article 2), the parol evidence rule (Article 2
wanted to liberalize the rule, but Article 2B strengthened it; ultimately, Article 2
was made to conform to Article 2B), and contract policing (Article 2 contained addi-
tional provisions absent in Article 2B that were eventually eliminated).
18. Letter from State Attorneys General to Gene N. Lebrun, President of the
NCCUSL (July 23, 1999), available at http//www.2bguide.comdocsI799ags.html
(last visited Sept. 8, 2001); Letter from Attorneys General of 11 States to Gene
Lebrun, President of the NCCUSL (July 28, 1999), available at http://
www.2bguide.com/docs/799mags.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2001) (agreeing with
July 23, 1999, letter).
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clude application of UCITA by courts in that state even where the
parties have chosen UCITA as the governing body of law.19 Oppo-
sition and dissension has surfaced in other bodies as well, such as
the American Bar Association, which had observers attending all
drafting committee meetings and is normally called upon to en-
dorse uniform acts produced by the National Conference. 20 The ac-
19. Three states have already adopted such "anti-UCITA" legislation. Ironi-
cally, these states (Iowa, West Virginia and North Carolina) have included such a
provision in their enactment of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, another
product of the National Conference. See Uniform Electronic Transactions Act,
Iowa Code Ann. § 554D (West Supp. 2001), 2000 Iowa Legis. Serv. H.D. 2205
(West) (last visited Aug. 8, 2001), available at http://www.legis.state.ia.us/GA/
78GA/Legislation/HF/02200/HF02205/Current.html (codified at Iowa Code
§ 554D.104 (repealed 2001)) ("A choice of law provision... which provides that the
contract is to be interpreted pursuant to the laws of a state that has enacted the
uniform computer information transactions Act... or any substantially similar
law, is voidable."); Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, W. Va. Code § 55-8-15
(2001), 2001 W. Va. Leg. Serv. 120 (West); Uniform Electronic Transactions Act,
ch. 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 2001-295 sec. 66-329 (July 21, 2001). Ironically, at the
time West Virginia passed this provision, it was the home of the president of the
NCCUSL. More recently, the New York Attorney General's office proposed legisla-
tion would declare that UCITA violates New York public policy. The concern of the
N.Y. Attorney General was the impact of UCITA on consumers, and particularly
UCITA's validation of click-wrap contracting practices and licenses that "diminish
significant rights and protections established over many years for the protection of
consumers" in New York. N.Y. Attorney General's Legislative Program Bill No.
33-01, 12 BNA Electronic Com. & L. Rep. 288 (2001); see Am. Online, Inc. v. Supe-
rior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (invalidating a choice of
forum and law clause invoking Virginia law, including UCITA, as contrary to Cali-
fornia public policy.).
20. Typically, upon the completion of new proposed uniform legislation, the
National Conference places the item on the agenda of the House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association for ratification by that group. In the year following the
completion of UCITA, the National Conference submitted a resolution calling for
ABA approval of another piece of electronic commerce legislation, the Uniform
Electronic Transactions Act, but failed to put UCITA on the agenda of the House.
To the extent that this failure illustrated a perception that there would be a fight
in the House over any such resolution, the perception has proven to be true. In the
Summer of 2001, a resolution was introduced in the House that would disapprove
of UCITA and call upon the Conference to withdraw it as a proposed statute for
state enactment. This resolution was withdrawn by its sponsor, the Torts Insur-
ance and Practice Section, pending additional discussions between the ABA and
the National Conference on substantive objections to UCITA. In January 2002 an
ABA Working Group issued its report on UCITA, describing it as "a very complex
statute for even knowledgeable lawyers to understand and apply," and concluding
that in addition to requiring substantial changes in many of its sections, UCITA
should be "redrafted to make it easier to understand and use." American Bar As-
sociation Working Group Report on the Uniform Computer Information Transac-
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ademic literature abounds with critiques of UCITA21 and even
regulatory bodies such as the Federal Trade Commission have ex-
pressed reservations about the product.22 Whether or not one
agrees with the arguments raised by opponents of UCITA, the fact
remains that at this stage there is no consensus about its
acceptability.
Last, events occurring in 1999 have undoubtedly had the most
significant impact on Article 2B (soon to become UCITA) and its
chances of enactability: attempts to include the treatment of infor-
mation within the Uniform Commercial Code (as Article 2B Li-
censing) were abandoned; the American Law Institute withdrew
from the process; and the National Conference reformulated the
draft as a freestanding uniform act. The only "official" reason
given for the split, according to the joint press release of the two
organizations, was that "this area [computer information transac-
tions] does not presently allow the sort of codification that is repre-
sented by the Uniform Commercial Code." 23 The problem was
much more fundamental.
tions Act (UCITA), Jan. 31, 2002, available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/
ucita.pdf.
21. See, e.g., Symposium, Intellectual Property and Contract Law in the Infor-
mation Age: The Impact of Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Fu-
ture of Information and Commerce, 13 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 809 (1998) (criticizing
the predecessor of UCITA); Symposium, Intellectual Property and Contract Law
for the Information Age: The Impact of Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code
on the Future of Information and Commerce, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1999) (same).
22. In October of 2000, the Federal Trade Commission held a Public Work-
shop on Warranty Protection for High-Tech Products and Services devoted almost
exclusively to whether the FTC should enact consumer protection provisions to
supplement or override UCITA. See Federal Trade Commission: Warranty Protec-
tion for High-Tech Products and Services, at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/
warranty/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2001); Letter from the Bureau of Consumer Protec-
tion, Bureau of Competition, Policy Planning of the Federal Trade Commission, to
Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., Chairman of the NCCUSL Article 2B Drafting Committee
(Oct. 30, 1998), available at httpA/www.ftc.gov/betv980032.htm (last visited Sept.
8, 2001) (expressing concerns about Article 2B); Letter from the Bureau of Con-
sumer Protection, Bureau of Competition, Policy Planning of the Federal Trade
Commission, to John L. McClaugherty, Chair of the Executive Committee of the
NCCUSL (July 9, 1999), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/v990010.htm (last vis-
ited Sept. 8, 2001) (stating that concerns of prior letter were not addressed in any
significant respect).
23. Joint Press Release, ALI-NCCUSL, NCCUSL to Promulgate Freestanding
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act-ALI and NCCUSL Announce
that Legal Rules for Computer Information Will Not Be Part of UCC (Apr. 7, 1999),
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/2brel.htm (last visited Dec. 18,
2001) ("The Conference believes that UCITA can provide a framework in which
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The decision to part ways with Article 2B came after several
years of mounting tension about this project between the two spon-
soring organizations. 24 In 1998, and again in 1999, the American
Law Institute refused to put Article 2B on the agenda for approval
at its annual meetings. 26 Even in its stance as a "discussion draft,"
Article 2B attracted much criticism at the annual ALI meetings,
precipitating significant motions for changes in substance.26 An
sound business practices may further evolve in the marketplace bounded by stan-
dards of appropriate public policy."). The press release does not say that the Amer-
ican Law Institute shared that belief.
24. It should be noted that the "tension" referred to is not tension between the
two bodies as a whole, but a tension between the leadership of those bodies.
UCITA was not without controversy even within the NCCUSL process. Objections
to UCITA were so strong that the 1999 motion to refer UCITA for a final vote by
the Conference (normally a pro forma matter) was highly debated and only passed
by a 37-11 vote with five abstaining; the final vote of the states on UCITA was 43-
6, with two states voting to abstain and two states not voting at all. [The total
number of states is fifty-three not fifty, as the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico
and the Virgin Islands are also counted.) The final approving vote was undoubt-
edly influenced by pleas from Conference leadership who maintained that unless
UCITA was passed, the Conference would be preempted by Congress (an event
which did not come to pass) and who asked that UCITA be passed to allow a field
test of its provisions in the states with no obligation on individual commissioners
to support it. Many undoubtedly expected UCITA to die a natural death upon its
final promulgation.
25. See Press Release, ALI, Major Projects Scheduled for Completion at Ameri-
can Law Institute's 75th Annual Meeting (May 1, 1998), available at http:/
www.ali.org/ali/prO5Ol.htm (last visited Sept. 8,2001) ("[A] special ad hoc commit-
tee of the Institute's Council has recommended that ALI take no final action this
year because of present concerns about both the architecture and scope of 2B.");
Institute to Review Seven Drafts at 1999 Annual Meeting, A.L.I. Rep. (Winter
1999), available at http://www.ali.org/ali/Rptr-7drafts.htm (last visited Sept. 8,
2001) ("While the leadership of NCCUSL also plans to seek final approval of Arti-
cle 2B this year, the ALI Council continues to have significant reservations about
2B, especially concerning its provisions on scope, invalidation for fundamental
public policy, and assent to post-transaction terms, but also regarding its overall
coherence and clarity.").
26. See, e.g., Jean Braucher & Peter Linzer, Motion Regarding Assent Issues
in Proposed UCC Article 2B (May 5, 1998), at http://www.ali.org/ali/Braucher.htm
(last visited Nov. 17, 2001); Charles R. McManis, Motion Regarding UCC Article
2B § 2B-308 (Tentative Draft Apr. 14, 1997) (May 9, 1997), available at httpi/
www.ali.org/ali/McManis.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2001); Charles R. McManis,
Motion Regarding UCC Article 2B § 2B-208 (Mass Market Licenses) and § 2B-105
(Relationship to federal law)(Tentative Draft, Apr. 15, 1998) (May 5, 1998), availa-
ble at http://www.ali-aba.org/ali/McManis2.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2001); Wil-
liam J. Woodward, Jr., Motion to Delete Section 2B-107(a) from Draft UCC Article
2B (May 6, 1998), at http:/www.ali.org/ali/Woodwardl.htm (last visited Nov. 17,
2001); William J. Woodward, Jr., Motion to Delete Section 2B-108 from Draft UCC
Article 2B (May 6, 1998), at http:/www.ali.org/ali/Woodward2.htm (last visited
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ALI official publication, reporting on the joint decision to remove
Article 2B from the Uniform Commercial Code, explained that
while the National Conference believed that "the proposed statute
is currently ready to provide a viable legal framework for the
evolution of sound business practices in computer-information
transactions," the American Law Institute Council "continued to
have significant reservations about both some of its key substan-
tive provisions and its overall clarity and coherence."27 The sub-
stantive basis for the ALI decision could not be clearer. Following
the withdrawal of the ALI from the process, the three ALI mem-
bers of the drafting committee were asked to remain as advisors,
Nov. 17, 2001). For additional motions, see http//www.ali.org/ali/Motions.htm
(last visited Nov. 17, 2001).
27. Article 2B Is Withdrawn from UCC and Will Be Promulgated by NCCUSL
as Separate Act, A.L.I. Rep. (Spring 1999), available at http://www.ali.org/ali/
R2103_Art2b.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2001); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Re-
port of the Director, Address Before the American Law Institute (May 1999), in 76
A.L.I. Proc. 11 (2000), available at http://www.ali.org/AR99_director.htm (last vis-
ited Sept. 8, 2001) ("There has been great difficulty in arriving at a suitable defini-
tion of the scope of the provisions aimed at licensing and some differences
concerning the provisions on electronic contracting."); Letter from Geoffrey C. Haz-
ard, Jr., Director of the ALI, to Gene N. Lebrun, President of the NCCUSL, and
Charles A. Wright, President of the ALI (Mar. 26, 1998), at http://
www.2bguide.com/docs/ghmar98.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2001) (stating that the
text "needs significant revision" and expressing concerns regarding scope, architec-
ture, clarity of expression, relation to other law, electronic contracting, and other
controversial issues); Memorandum from Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., et. al., to Draft-
ing Committee on Uniform Commercial Code Article 2B-Licenses, July 1998 Draft:
Suggested Changes (Oct. 9, 1998), available at http://www.2bguide.com/docsl
gch1098.pdf (making suggestions: scope too broad; need to cover all access con-
tracts questionable; post-contract assent provisions not true assent; contract for-
mation provisions should be drafted by an appropriate group "that considers these
matters in broader context" than Article 2B); Memorandum from David A. Rice,
ALI Drafting Committee Member, to Article 2B Drafting Committee (Mar. 18,
1998), available at http://www.2bguide.com/docs/ricemar.html (last visited Sept. 8,
2001) (commenting and proposing changes to Article 2B); Memorandum from
David A. Rice to ALI Council Subcommittee on Article 2B, Critical Considerations
Concerning the Readiness of Article 2B (Mar. 17, 1998), available at httpi/
www.2bguide.com/docs/ricemar.html#alic (last visited Nov. 17, 2001); Memoran-
dum from Amelia H. Boss, et al., to UCC2B Drafting Committee and Raymond T.
Nimmer (Nov. 4, 1996), available at www.2bguide.com/docstpolmem.html (last vis-
ited Setp. 8, 2001) (proposing policy issues for resolution). Some took great offense
at the ALI's criticism of Article 2B, reducing the debate to (anonymous) ad
hominem attacks. See A Firefly on the Wall: The UCC2B Experience, available at
http://www.2bguide.com/docs/afotw.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2001) (responding to
Geoffrey Hazard's comments made at the meeting).
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but declined, citing "a number of underlying concerns including
matters of substance, process, and product:"
In terms of product, the draft has, in attempting to address
numerous concerns of affected constituencies, progressively
moved away from articulating sufficient and generally appli-
cable default rules toward establishing increasingly particu-
lar and detailed rules. In so doing, the draft sacrificed the
flexibility necessary to accommodate continuing fast-paced
changes in technology, distribution, and contracting. In
terms of process, the guiding principle appeared to be the
Conference's desire to expedite approval and commence en-
actment of the draft. This led to obviating rather than learn-
ing from strong concerns expressed by Conference and
Institute discussions over the entire course of the project,
ranging from scope and drafting to the interplay with intel-
lectual property rules. Substantively... the three of us often
disagree. Yet we believe that some rules, although they may
assure important constituencies' support for the draft, none-
theless jeopardize enactability because of the ultimate bal-
ance of interests achieved.
These are not new, or newly expressed, concerns. They are
fundamental concerns and have been aired before in Conference
and Institute discussions, by individual members, Drafting Com-
mittee members and observers, and Internet discussion list partici-
pants, as well as by software and other computer science
enterprises and professional organizations, law professors, and ed-
itorial writers. The persistent din of these concerns has contrib-
uted significantly to our decision to decline the invitation to
participate as advisors.28
28. See Memorandum from David Bartlett et al., to Uniform Computer Trans-
actions Act Drafting Committee (May 7, 1999), available at http://
www.2bguide.com/docs/50799dad.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2001). It should be
emphasized that the three of us were seldom aligned on individual substantive
issues that came before the drafting committee; nonetheless, we were united in our
decisions to recommend that the ALI withdraw from the project and to decline to
continue our own participation.
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II. THE INTERNATIONAL DEBATE
A. Goods, Services, or Sui Generis: Herein the application of
the CISG
Although UCITA is a domestic statute written against the
backdrop of US law, the pressures that were behind its evolution
are present on the international level as well. With the growth of
information transactions, there has been increasing recognition
that many of the primary sources of law governing international
commercial transactions do not effectively cover information. Just
as the UCITA discussions had their origins in dialogue over
whether and to what extent Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code might be adapted to cover information, 29 the same question is
being asked globally (in case law, in academic literature and in the
legislative process) about the UNCITRAL Convention on the Inter-
national Sale of Goods (CISG).30 Should the international
equivalent of UCC Article 2, the United Nations Convention on the
International Sale of Goods, be modified to accommodate non-
goods transactions?31
The scope of the CISG is limited, both in terms of the subject
matter of the transaction (goods) and the structure of the transac-
29. See Boss & Woodward, supra note 10; Boss et. al., supra note 10; Ritter,
supra note 10.
30. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, art. 19(3), U.N. Doc. A/CF.97/18 (1980), available at http:ll
www.uncitral.orglenglisldtexts/sales/CISG.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2001) [here-
inafter CISGI. For example, the question of whether to classify software transac-
tions as goods transactions arises in contexts other than the sale of goods, such as
their treatment under trade agreements within the WTO. See, e.g., Stewart A.
Baker et al., E-Products and the WTO, 35 Int'l Law. 5 (2001); Joseph Tasker, Jr.,
The Information Technology Agreement: Building A Global Information Infrastruc-
ture While Avoiding Customs Classification Disputes, 26 Brook. J. Int'l L. 917, 947
(2001).
31. For selected articles on the extension of the Convention on the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods to software see infra note 34. The question of whether infor-
mation transactions are analogous to goods transactions is being debated in many
areas in addition to the area of general contract law. In WTO discussions, for ex-
ample, the question is whether information fits within GATT (goods) or GATS
(services).
There is a second issue raised about the coverage of the CISG: whether it
should deal with electronic transactions-i.e., those contracts electronically cre-
ated. The question of the medium of the communication, dealt with by the UNCI-
TRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, is distinct from the question of the
nature of the subject matter of the transaction.
2001] TAKING UCITA ON THE ROAD
tion (sales).32 Although the Convention is limited to goods, the
term is not defined.3 3 Thus, there is the question of whether the
term "goods" should be construed to apply to "virtual goods." The
argument has been made by legal commentators that the sale of
software may fall under the Convention's substantive sphere of ap-
plication, even though it is not tangible, with the qualification be-
ing that the software be "off the rack" software i.e., not custom-
made software or software that has been extensively modified to
meet the user's needs. 34 Recent judicial decisions have supported
such application.35 To the extent, however, that the result is ar-
guably unclear, it has been maintained that the CISG should be
extended to services and intangibles to deal with electronic
commerce.
36
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law,
which was responsible for the drafting of the CISG, has also been a
key player in the development of legal structures for electronic
commerce: in 1996 it completed its work on the Model Law on Elec-
32. CISG, supra note 30, at Annex I. A third limitation in the application of
the CISG is that it is inapplicable to consumer transactions, which currently re-
present a significant proportion of international electronic commerce.
33. Id. $ 21-22.
34. See, e.g., Christina H. Ramberg, The E-Commerce Directive and Formation
of Contract in a Comparative Perspective, 26 Eur. L. Rev. 449 (2001) (urging exten-
sion of CISG to services and intangibles to deal with electronic commerce and not-
ing that the Principles of European Contract Law and the UNIDROIT Principles
on International Commercial Contracts had already extended many of the provi-
sions of the CISG outside the goods context); Frank Diedrich, Maintaining Uni-
formity in International Uniform Law Via Autonomous Interpretations: Software
Contracts and the CISG, 8 Pace Intl L. Rev. 303,336 (1996) (stating that CISG can
be applied to computer software); Trevor Cox, Chaos Versus Uniformity: The Diver-
gent Views of Software in the International Community, 4 Vindabona J. Int'l Com.
L. & Arb. 3 (2000); see also James E. Bailey, Facing the Truth: Seeing the Conven-
tion on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods as an Obstacle to a Uniform
Law of International Sales, 32 Cornell Int'l L.J. 273 (1999) (challenging belief that
CISG reaches uniformity); Marcus G. Larson, Applying Uniform Sales Law to In-
ternational Software Transactions: The Use of the CISG, Its Shortcomings, and a
Comparative Look at How the Proposed UCC Article 2B Would Remedy Them, 5
Tul. J. Intl & Comp. L. 445 (1997) (discussing the applicability of CISG to software
sales).
35. OLG Koln, 26 August 1994, Neue Juristische Wochershrift Recht-
sprechungs-Report 246 (1995) = CLOUT case n. 122; OLG Koblenz, 17 September
1993, Recht der internationale Wirtschaft 934 (1993) = CLOUT case n. 281. The
CLOUT reference is to the UNCITRAL project (Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts)
reporting on all cases involving the interpretation of the CISG and other UNCI-
TRAL products. See http//www.uncitral.org.
36. See supra note 34.
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tronic Commerce,37 and in 2001 it completed work on the Model
Law on Electronic Signatures. 38 In its deliberations in the winter
of 2001 on potential future work in the area, the UNCITRAL
Working Group on Electronic Commerce turned its attention to the
CISG.39 In addition to looking at whether the sales Convention
needs to be updated to take into account the electronic formation of
contracts, the question was raised as to whether its scope should
be extended beyond goods to information-or what the report
called "virtual goods." "It is apparent that a clarification of
whether the software should be considered as 'goods' in the sense
of the Convention would be useful in order to ensure uniformity."40
Revisions could clarify that the CISG covers all software, only
software incorporated into tangible goods, or only off-the-shelf (i.e.,
non-custom) software.4 1
The scope issue under the Convention involves not only the
issue of what constitutes "goods" but what constitutes a "sale."
Much software is not sold but rather licensed. "The differences in
these approaches are considerable. A sales contract, for instance,
frees the buyer (i.e., "user") from restrictions as to the use of the
product bought and, thus, clearly delineates the boundaries of con-
trol that may be exercised . . .In contrast, a license agreement
allows the producer or developer of 'virtual goods' (or services) to
exercise control over the product down through the licensing
chain."42
37. U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic
Commerce with Guide to Enactment (Dec. 16, 1996), available at http:/!
www.uncitral.orgenglish/texts/electcomml-ecomm.htm (last visited Sept. 8,
2001).
38. U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic
Signatures, U.N. Doc. A/56/17, Supp. 17, Annex II (June 23, 2001), available at
http://wwwuncitral.orgenglish/texts/electcom/ml-elecsig-e.pdf (last visited Nov.
17, 2001); see also Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic
Signatures, U.N. Doc. A1CN.9/WG.IV/WP.88 (Jan. 30, 2001), available at http:!!
www.uncitral.org/english/workinggroups/wg-ecwp-88e.pdf (last visited Sept. 8,
2001).
39. See Legal Aspects of Electronic Commerce: Possible Future Work in the
Field of Electronic Contracting: An Analysis of the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG/IV/WP.91
(Feb. 9, 2001) [hereinafter Legal Aspects].
40. Id. 24.
41. Id.
42. Id. 28.
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The issues confronting UNCITRAL then included whether the
scope of the CISG should be broadened to pick up software licens-
ing agreements, or whether the rules derived from the CISG
should be developed for these kinds of transactions. The Working
Group report to UNCITRAL, however, placed more emphasis on
the application of the CISG to contracts concluded by electronic
means for the international sale of tangible goods "in view of the
urgent need for the introduction of the legal rules that would be
needed to bring certainty and predictability to the international
regime governing Internet-based and other electronic commerce
transactions."43 Apparently recognizing the controversy surround-
ing the enactment of UCITA, the report was cautious in recom-
mending any expansion of the CISG to non-tangible goods
transactions: "Broadening the scope of such work so as to include
transactions involving goods other than tangible goods, such as the
so-called "virtual goods" or rights in data, was an avenue that
should be approached with caution, given the uncertainty of
achieving consensus on a harmonized regime."44 Nonetheless, the
report cryptically noted:
There was general agreement within the Working Group that
existing international instruments, notably the United Na-
tions Sales Convention, did not cover a variety of transactions
currently made online and that it might be useful to develop
harmonized rules to govern international transactions other
than sales of movable tangible goods in the traditional sense.
The Working Group proceeded to consider what elements
should be taken into account to define the scope of application
of such a new international regime.45
Ultimately, the Working Group to the Commission recom-
mended that preparation of a legal instrument "dealing with cer-
tain legal issues in electronic contracting be begun on a priority
basis."46 What is unclear is the extent to which that instrument
will include work in the area of software, computer information
43. U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, Report of the Working Group on Elec-
tronic Commerce on the Work of Its 38th Session, U.N. Doc. AICN.9/484, 91 95 (Apr.
14, 2001). The issues preliminarily identified were: offer and acceptance; receipt
and dispatch; internationality of the sales transaction; and parties to the sales
transaction.
44. Id.
45. Id. 91 115 (emphasis added).
46. Id. 91 134.
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and licensing.47 Also unclear is the extent to which UCITA will be
used as a model in those deliberations. The Secretariat, in its re-
port to the Working Group on the issue, noted the existence of
other instruments, including UCITA, designed to harmonize cer-
tain areas of electronic commerce and suggested that further study
of these rules needed to be undertaken.48 Undoubtedly because of a
recognition of the controversial nature of UCITA, references to it
were conspicuously missing from the Working Group report to the
Commission.
B. UCITA's Implications for the CISG
The debates surrounding UCITA (and not necessarily the pro-
visions of UCITA as they stand in the official version) might shed
light on three issues confronting UNCITRAL: whether (or how) to
extend the scope of the CISG beyond pure goods; adapting the ex-
isting contract formation rules of the CISG (beyond merely incor-
porating the electronic contracting provisions of the Model Law) to
address newer contracting methods such as shrink-wrap or click-
wrap used frequently in electronic commerce; and extension of the
47. There are "electronic contracting" and scope issues under the CISG that do
not implicate the question of whether the CISG should be extended beyond the
sale of goods: how to determine the "internationality" of a transaction for purposes
of determining the applicability of the Convention; the "place of conclusion of the
contract"; who are parties to the sales convention, especially when automated sys-
tems or "electronic agents" are used; coverage of consumer contracts and particu-
larly consumer protection issues; offer and acceptance, including manifestation of
assent; receipt and dispatch. Id. II 96-113, 119-22, 125-27.
48. Legal Aspects, supra note 39, L 7.
As an example of such rules that may require further study, the Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) was developed in the
United States of America, since it was felt that the approach of the 'sale of
goods' transactions embodied in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) was
not adequate to address the way in which technology services and items
such as software were being sold.
Id. The Secretariat's report also noted two ICC projects: the draft Uniform Rules
and Guidelines for Electronic Trade and Settlement (URETS) and the Model Elec-
tronic Sales Contract. Id. Elsewhere, the UNCITRAL staff member for the Work-
ing Group on Electronic Commerce for UNCITRAL noted that UCITA "may serve
as a useful introduction to electronic contracting issues that should be addressed,
in addition to those already included in the Model Law, on a global scale." Renaud
Sorieul et al., Establishing a Legal Framework for Electronic Commerce: The Work
of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), 35
Int'l Law. 107, 120 (2001).
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CISG into the consumer area. Each of these three areas has been
extremely controversial in the UCITA process.
Scope
The appropriate scope of UCITA has been a persistent prob-
lem throughout its drafting history. As was noted earlier, work on
information contracts in the United States began with an examina-
tion of the scope of Article 2. Attempts to broaden Article 2 to
cover software were ultimately abandoned in favor of separate
statutory treatment of goods and information. As also noted ear-
lier, the decision to separate goods and software was not one
reached by the drafting committee, but by the Conference leader-
ship, its decision representing a political or administrative decision
much more than a decision on the merits. After the split, the scope
provisions of UCITA (and its predecessor, Article 2B) received a
great deal of discussion throughout the remaining drafting pro-
cess, were the object of most of the criticism of the draft by the
American Law Institute, and have continued to be quite controver-
sial.49 As the history of UCITA demonstrates, there was a two-fold
recognition in the drafting process: that to some extent the applica-
tion of some of the sales provisions to soft are and information
products wag appropriate, but that there was a need for different
rules in certain areas. The first battleground has been on where
there are sufficient differences to justify different rules i.e., which
of Article 2's rules could be applied without change to software or
information contracts. Industry has been adamant in its opposi-
tion to the expansion of Article 2 in any fashion to cover informa-
tion products (including software).50 That opposition ultimately
led to the split between Articles 2 and Article 2B. After the split,
however, a second battleground developed that still persists: what
transactions are covered by the old sale of goods rubric (Article 2)
and which are subject to the new act (UCITA).
After abandonment of attempts to include software products
within the scope of the Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
efforts were made to define the line between what constituted
goods (covered by the UCC) and what constituted information (gov-
49. See supra notes 25, 27.
50. See, e.g., Lorin Brennan, Why Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software Transac-
tions, 38 Duq. L. Rev. 459 (2000) (arguing, however, that either Article 2 must
apply in its totality or a separate statute must govern).
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erned by Article 2B or UCITA).51 Since both Article 2 and UCITA
contain scope provisions, two different but interrelated debates
flourished. Those supporting UCITA (and its substantive provi-
sions) wanted as broad a scope provision as possible in that act and
as restrictive a scope provision as possible for Article 2; in addition,
they wanted to give the parties the ability to opt into the scope of
UCITA through contract. 52 Those opposing UCITA, of course,
wanted to keep its scope narrow and were opposed to any attempt
to limit the scope of Article 2 in any way. Some were of the view
that software and information (particularly off-the-shelf software)
should not be excluded at all from the definition of goods, primarily
on the grounds that this would deny purchasers protections they
previously had.53
51. Indeed, not only did the decision to split Article 2B off from Article 2 in-
crease the importance of the scope provisions, it turned the scope provisions of both
drafts into a "political football." See Speidel, Symposium Intro, supra note 12, at
792 ("[Alfter the collapse of "hub and spoke," there was growing tension between
the Article 2 and the Article 2B projects (now UCITA), both as to the degree of
textual conformity that should exist between them and the line beyond which a
sale of goods stopped and a computer information transaction began. That tension
persists to this day."); see also Ann Lousin, Proposed UCC 2-103 of the 2000 Ver-
sion of the Revision of Article 2, 54 SMU L. Rev. 913 (2001) (explaining the changes
to the draft Article 2). For a critique of the current scope provisions of UCITA, see
Stephen Y. Chow, UCITA- A 1990's Vision of E-Commerce, 18 J. Marshall J. Com-
puter & Info. L. 323 (1999).
52. The broad reach of UCITA, and the potential it might sweep in transac-
tions that would otherwise be governed by Article 2, led to a motion at the 1998
ALI Annual Meeting discussing Article 2B, the predecessor of UCITA, to "limit the
scope of Article 2B to software contracts, access contracts, and such other transac-
tions as are included expressly and defined with sufficient clarity to avoid surprise
to affected parties." The motion was withdrawn in light of representations by the
Chair of the Drafting Committee that a task force would be producing a report on
the appropriate scope of Article 2B. Actions Taken with Respect to Drafts Submit-
ted at 1998 Annual Meeting, at http://www.ali.org/ali/ACTIONS.htm (last visited
Jan. 13, 2002).
53. The argument was that courts had "gotten it right" when the question had
arisen in the past, and thus it would be inadvisable to override existing law. See,
e.g., Stephen Y. Chow, Motions Relating to Proposed Revised Uniform Commercial
Code Article 2 (1999), at httpA/www.ali-aba.orgali/1999-CHOW UCC2.htm (last
visited Sept. 8, 2001); Memorandum from Jean Braucher & Peter Linzer to Mem-
bers of the American Law Institute (May 5, 1998), available at http:/ /www.ali-
aba.orglali/braucher.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2001). At the 1998 ALI Annual
Meeting, a motion was made to delete the scope provisions in the 1998 Article 2
draft that would have excluded software from Article 2 coverage in order to remain
silent on the issue; the motion was defeated by a vote of 97 to 78. See Actions
Taken with Respect to Drafts Submitted at 1999 Annual Meeting, available at
http://www.ali.org (last visited Nov. 17, 2001); see also Peter A. Alces, W(h)ither
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One issue was the mixed transaction: goods with an element of
information (either "embedded" in or packaged with the goods).
Critics of UCITA expressed concern (i) that the presence of
software or information would appropriately exclude something
from Article 2 coverage; and (ii) that in appropriate circumstances
Article 2 would cover both the information and the goods as a
unit.54 By contrast, supporters of UCITA wanted to retain the
ability, to the extent possible, to have UCITA continue to cover the
information and even the medium or tangible good on which the
information was delivered.55 Extreme discomfort with the scope
provisions of Article 2 (based in part on the UCITA formulation)
led to a straw vote of the membership of the Institute in 2000
favoring a clear statutory statement that coverage of Article 2 ex-
tends to so-called "smart goods," products (such as a refrigerator or
a car) that include computer programs important to their perform-
ance.56 Efforts to produce an acceptable scope provision continued
to engender controversy, and, following an online discussion forum
Warranty: The B(l)oom of Products Liability Theory in Cases of Deficient Software
Design, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 271 (1999) (concluding that strict liability could replace the
warranty protections in the UCC); Marion W. Benfield, Jr. & Peter A. Alces,
Reinventing the Wheel, 35 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 1405 (1994) (analyzing the hub and
spoke approach with regard to contract law and commercial law).
54. The classic example is the automobile with a computer chip controlling the
automatic braking system. The consensus was that, in the event of a failure of the
braking system, the buyer of the car would be able to proceed under Article 2 and
not have her remedies depend upon proof of whether the hardware or the software
was the cause. For a criticism of UCITA's treatment of the mixed transaction, see
Chow, supra note 51, at 331.
55. UCITA as currently drafted covers not only computer software, but the
medium on which it is stored, i.e., the "copy." See UCITA § 103(b)(1).
[This] Act treats the medium that carries the computer information as
part of the computer information and within this Act, whether the me-
dium is a tangible object or electronic. This Act applies to the copy, docu-
mentation, and packaging of computer information; these are within the
definition of computer information itself. They are mere incidents of the
transfer of the information.
Id. at cmt. 4(b)(ii) (citation omitted).
56. Article 2 Update, A.L.I. Rep. (Summer 2000), at http://www.ali.org/ali/
R2204-Update.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2001); Actions Taken on 2000 Annual
Meeting Drafts, at http:/www.ali.org (last visited Nov. 17, 2001). See also Heavy
Agenda Planned for 2001 Annual Meeting, A.L.I. Rep. (Winter 2001), at http://
www.ali.org/ali/R2302_heavy.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2001) ("The most difficult
and controversial problem confronting the drafters of Revised Article 2 of the UCC
has been that of determining and defining the extent to which computer programs
associated with goods, particularly those contained in so-called 'smart goods,'
should be subject to the provisions of Article 2.").
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hosted by the Institute, these efforts were abandoned. The draft
finally approved by the Institute in May 2001 made no attempts at
all to change the scope provisions to address computer software or
information generally. 57 Ironically, the failure to amend the scope
of Article 2 has caused some interest groups (particularly the
software industry) to announce their opposition to the amend-
ments to Article 2 as they go forward to the National Conference
for approval. 58
Contract Formation
The second area of controversy that may have important
ramifications on the CISG discussions on electronic contracting is
the treatment of contract formation issues in the context of licens-
ing, and in particular, its application to shrink-wrap situations
(where an item is purchased in a box or wrapping containing lan-
guage that by opening or using the item, the user consents to terms
contained therein) as well as click wrap situations (where a party
signifies its acceptance of new or additional terms by a mere mouse
click). In many respects, this second set of issues deals with
straight contract formation. Theoretically, contract formation
rules should be the same, no matter what the nature or subject
57. See Proposed Amendments for Uniform Commercial Code Article 2-Sales
(May 2001), available at http//www.law.upenn.edu/blYulc/ucc2/ART20501.htm
(last visited Sept. 8, 2001) (noting in the Prefatory Note to the draft: "These
amendments also reflect an inability to reach reasonable consensus on some is-
sues, such as ... the proper scope of the Article.").
58. See Letter from Microsoft to Commissioners of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (July 2001). The desire of industry to push
for a carve-out, particularly for pure information, was undoubtedly spurred by
cases such as Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (purporting to apply Article 2 to pure information contracts such
as Internet downloads where only information and no goods are involved).
At the August 2001 Annual Meeting of the National Conference, the software
and information industries succeeded in convincing the Drafting Committee to
change its position, by a vote of 6-3, and recommend a new scope provision carving
out information from the coverage of Article 2, and introducing new provisions to
govern mixed transactions. Later that day, the new provision survived a motion to
delete on the floor of the Conference by a vote of 60 to 98, but a motion necessary to
obtain NCCUSL approval of the entire project (including the new scope provision)
failed on a vote of 53 to 89. This leaves the issue of the scope of revised Article 2,
and indeed the larger question of whether there will ever be a revised or amended
Article 2, unresolved.
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matter of the transaction,5 9 yet there was continual tension be-
tween the Article 2 and Article 2B processes as to what those cor-
rect contract formation rules should be. The contract formation
rules of UCITA have proven to be quite controversial, in large part
because of their impact upon intellectual property law regimes.60
Even apart from their content, however, the approach exemplified
by UCITA's provisions has been challenged, and indeed they have
not been mirrored in the Article 2 contract formation provisions. 61
UCITA legitimates both shrink-wrap and click-wrap agree-
ments.6 2 Key to its provisions is the concept of "manifesting as-
sent" after an "opportunity to review" the terms of a standard form
license of information.63 Although there is general agreement that
parties should be able to contractually agree to the terms applica-
ble to their transaction,64 the continuing refrain heard from oppo-
nents is that under UCITA there is no true bargain and no true
"meeting of minds," and thus there is no contract in a classical
59. As Judge Easterbrook said in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147,
1149 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 808 (1997) (involving a purchase of a
computer which was delivered with new and additional terms), about attempts to
distinguish the prior case of ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996)
(involving purchased software which came with a shrink-wrap license limiting
use): "ProCD is about the law of contract, not about the law of software."
60. See infra notes 123-44 and accompanying text; see also Brennan, supra
note 50.
61. See, e.g., Speidel, Trenches, supra note 12; Rusch, supra note 12.
62. Most shrink-wrap or click-wrap agreements would qualify as "mass mar-
ket" licenses under UCITA's provisions, and their enforceability would be governed
by UCITA § 209. See UCITA § 112 & official cmt. 5 (setting forth several illustra-
tions of the enforceability of click-wrap agreements).
63. UCITA provides that an opportunity to review is presented if licensor dis-
plays "prominently and in close proximity to a description of the computer infor-
mation, or to instructions or steps for acquiring it, the standard terms or a
reference to an electronic location from which they can be readily obtained."
UCITA § 211. Alternatively, the license can "disclos[e] the availability of the stan-
dard terms ... on the site .. . and promptly furnish[ I a copy of th[osle standard
terms on request before the transfer of the computer information . . . ." Id. In
either case, the licensor is not permitted to prevent the printing or storage of the
standard terms for archival or review purposes by the licensee. Id.
64. This position was advanced by the Clinton administration as critical to the
developing framework for electronic commerce. Clinton & Gore, Framework,
supra note 7 ("In general, parties should be able to do business with each other on
the Internet under whatever terms and conditions they agree upon."). Freedom of
contract has been one of the key foundations of UCITA. See Carlyle C. Ring, Jr.,
Uniform Rules for Internet Information Transactions: An Overview of Proposed
UCITA, 38 Duq. L. Rev. 319 (2000).
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sense. 65 Such fictional assent is arguably present in a host of cir-
cumstances leading to a binding agreement under UCITA. For ex-
ample, assent may be found by a simple "click of the mouse"-or a
double-click-when a person is attempting to access information.
Thus, the person may not have read the terms, known they were
present, or even known that the "click" was a binding agreement,
and still be bound to the transaction. 66 Assent may be found
where an individual clicks through one screen on a website, even
though the governing terms are not themselves displayed on the
website but are simply available should the individual choose to
click through to another page. The terms to which the party
agreed may allow the licensor to define any conduct as assent in
the future, or it may allow the licensor in access contracts (involv-
ing electronic access to information on another's system)6 7 to uni-
laterally change the terms of the agreement. Thus, the concept of
"manifestation of assent" has been attacked as a mere fiction.68 In-
deed, recent events have demonstrated that not only are licensees
frequently unaware of the terms in click-wrap agreements, but
sometimes even the licensors are unaware of what they have in
65. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
(UCITA): Objections From The Consumer Perspective, 5 Cyberspace Law., Sept.
2000, at 2, available at http://www.cpsr.org/program/UCITA/braucher.html
(UCITA "validates fictional assent (e.g., double clicking a mouse to get access to a
product after you've paid for it) and even allows one party to define any conduct as
assent in future transactions, without requiring that form terms meet consumers'
reasonable expectations."); Chow, supra note 51, at 337.
66. Under UCITA, a person "manifests assent" if the person, after having an
opportunity to review the record or term, intentionally engages in conduct with
reason to know that the other party assents from that conduct. UCITA § 112(a). It
is not necessary that the person know whether the record or term exists; rather he
or she simply needs an opportunity to review. Nor is it necessary for the person to
know that their conduct constitutes assent; there need only be a "reason to know."
67. See UCITA § 102 (a)(1).
68. But see Raymond T. Nimmer, International Information Transactions: An
Essay on Law in an Information Society, 26 Brook. J. Int'l L. 5, 44-45 (2000).
Some have argued that a double click on an 'I agree' icon is only 'fictional'
assent that should be ignored.... Most likely, however, this argument is
disingenuous; the persons using it actually believe that parties should not
be bound by standard forms, even in the online world. But in Internet
commerce, all contracts involve standard forms. Does that then indicate
that contractual terms cannot be agreed to online? The consequences of
such a rule would be draconian and would contradict the basic notion of
contract and the economic reality of modem information commerce.
TAKING UCITA ON THE ROAD
their own standard form provisions, with the result that "implied
assent" is carried to a new level.69
Whatever one thinks of the "assent agreement" under domes-
tic United States law, there is the additional problem of its compat-
ibility with legal principles internationally. The expansive concept
of personal autonomy exemplified in UCITA has also been criti-
cized as contrary to non-U.S. concepts of assent.70 Additionally,
the UCITA provisions seem to conflict with principles articulated
in several international instruments. For example, a directive of
the European Union deems as presumptively unfair a term "irrevo-
cably binding the consumer to terms with which he had no real
opportunity of becoming acquainted before the conclusion of the
contract."71 Also deemed unfair are terms enabling the supplier to
alter the terms of the contract unilaterally without a valid reason
specified in the contract.7 2
In addition, UCITA for the first expressly validates post-pay-
ment disclosure of terms-"pay now, terms later"73-under what is
known as the "rolling contract" theory of contract formation. While
it may not always be possible to disclose (or make available) all
applicable terms prior to the creation of a binding agreement (as in
69. A recent incident involved Microsofts license for Passport, which pur-
ported to claim an ownership interest in all personal data passing through the
system, thus granting Microsoft the right to "use, modify, copy, distribute... or
sell" all personal data. When this draconian term (which had been included in the
license for some time) finally came to light, Microsoft responded that it was una-
ware of the term in its own licensing agreement. See Farhad Manjoo, Fine Print
Not Necessarily in Ink, Wired News (Apr. 6, 2001), available at httpi/
www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,42858,00.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2001). The
irony is, of course, that without judicial intervention setting aside the terms in the
Microsoft license, the licensor and the licensee have agreed to terms of which
neither are aware! Yet there has been the creation of an agreement under UCITA.
70. This is especially true in the intellectual property area. See Samuel K.
Murumba, The Emerging Law of the Digital Domain and the Contract 1IP Inter-
face: An Antipodean Perspective, 26 Brook. J. Int'l L. 91, 113 (2000) ("UCITA itself
rests less on any utilitarian conception and more on that most neo-Kantian and
neo-classical of all conceptions: autonomy. There is an unmistakable resistance in
Australia, and it seems in Europe, to a wholesale embrace of this super-naturalis-
tic view of intellectual property rights, whether it comes in the guise of autonomy
or code or both.").
71. Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 Apr. 1993 on Unfair Terms of Consumer
Contracts, 1993 O.J. (L 095) 29, Annex 1(i).
72. Id. at Annex 1(j).
73. Maureen A. O'Rourke, Progressing Towards a Uniform Commercial Code
for Electronic Commerce or Racing Towards Nonuniformity?, 14 Berkeley Tech.
L.J. 635, 651 (1999).
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the case of a telephone purchase order), that is not the case with
respect to online transactions where information can be made
readily accessible. Indeed, one can argue that the Internet is the
quintessential marketplace: a place where the notional or theoreti-
cal fully-informed party to a transaction can be more closely ap-
proximated than in physical markets; an environment capable of
providing the information that buyers need to make informed
shopping decisions.7 4 Rather than recognizing the ability of the
media to resolve informational distribution issues, however,
UCITA condones the delay of disclosure of terms until a consumer
is committed to the deal, no matter how important the terms.7 5
This is contrary to the approach in the European Union, where
prior disclosure of terms is mandated in certain instances.7 6 As
stated in Guidelines of the Organisation for Economic Co-Opera-
tion and Development: "Businesses engaged in electronic com-
merce should provide sufficient information about the terms,
conditions and costs associated with a transaction to enable con-
sumers to make an informed decision about whether to enter into
the transaction."77
The easier it is to find or imply assent to the terms of a con-
tract, the greater the pressure becomes to impose a method to pre-
vent unfair or overreaching terms in the resulting agreements. 78
The question of whether to enforce shrink-wrap or click-wrap li-
74. See id. at 652 ("Would it not be consistent . . . to draft legal rules that
enhance the market's efficiency by providing more information to customers, cor-
recting for information asymmetries that might otherwise exist and distort market
performance?"); see also Jean Braucher, Delayed Disclosure in Consumer E-Com-
merce as an Unfair and Deceptive Practice, 46 Wayne L. Rev. 1805 (2000) (arguing
that marketing to consumers online and failing to make pre-transaction disclo-
sures amounts, like other bait and switch practices, to unfair and deceptive prac-
tices in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act and states' little FTC acts).
75. See Braucher, supra note 65. UCITA does, however, contain a "safe har-
bor" to encourage posting. See UCITA § 211.
76. Council Directive 97/7/EC of 20 May 1997 on the Protection of Consumers
in Respect of Distance Contracts, 1997 O.J. (L 144) 19. A basic purpose of the
directive is consumer protection through prior information, written confirmations,
right of withdrawal, performance, payment by card, and prevention of inertia
selling.
77. Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Consumer
Protection in the Context of Electronic Commerce Guidelines, § III(C) (Dec. 9,
1999) [hereinafter OECD], available at http://www.oecd.org/oecd/pages/home/dis-
playgeneral/0,3380,EN-document-0-nodirectorate-no-24-320-0,FF.html.
78. The concept of contractual free choice and assent often sound good to the
businessperson:
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censes is related to a second problem: what techniques are there
for policing unfair or overreaching terms included in the license by
the licensor?79 To the extent that these click-wrap agreements are
adhesion contracts, the user or licensee effectively has no choice
but to accept the objectionable term or reject the entire transac-
tion. To the extent the user has already purchased a product and
then finds additional terms (either under a rolling contract theory
or because the licensor changes the terms after the conclusion of
the contract), the licensee may find itself bound by terms it had no
ability to negotiate.
Repeated attempts in the Article 2 revision process to deal
with unfair terms in adhesion contracts were constantly objected
to by industry groups, with the result that ultimately no changes
were included in the 2001 final amendments to Article 2.80 UCITA
deals with the objectionable term in the license in two ways.81
First, any term that is found to be "unconscionable" will be unen-
However, contract law has a darker side as well. Cyberspace is not an
egalitarian society with equal chances for every 'netizen.' In a world to-
tally ruled by contract, weaker parties risk being subjugated and funda-
mental freedoms may be jeopardized. Freedom of contract may become
contractual coercion, especially when dominant undertakings abuse their
market power to impose contractual rules on powerless consumers, as if
they were public authorities.
P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Copyright, Contract and the Code: What Will Remain of the
Public Domain, 26 Brook. J. Intl L. 77, 79 (2000).
79. See John J.A. Burke, Contract as Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach, 24
Seton Hall Legis. J. 285 (2000) (surveying the policing approaches available to
standard form contracts and recommending a regulatory response).
80. See, e.g., section 2-206(b) of the November 1, 1996, Council Draft (provid-
ing that where a consumer manifests assent to a "standard form, a term contained
in the form which the consumer could not have reasonably expected is not part of
contract unless the consumer expressly agrees to it."). In the July 1999 draft, sub-
section (a) to section 2-206 provided that "in a consumer contract, a court may
refuse to enforce a standard term in a record the inclusion of which was materially
inconsistent with reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in contracts of
that type, or... conflicts with one or more nonstandard terms to which the parties
have agreed." Commercial interests opposed all versions of new section 2-206, ar-
gued that the problem was already adequately addressed in the unconscionability
provisions of UCC section 2-302, and insisted that any efforts to particularize UCC
section 2-302 should be in the comments. See Speidel, Trenches, supra note 12
(calling attempts to draft a new provision particularizing the elements of uncon-
scionability for consumer contracts the "pea under the mattress"). See also infra
note 82.
81. In the drafting of UCITA (as well as the drafting of amendments to Article
2) attempts were made to deal with adhesion contracts generally. Ultimately,
those attempts were abandoned, primarily because of opposition from licensors.
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forceable.8 2 Second, if the term is available to the licensee only
after a person becomes obligated to pay or begins performance, the
licensee after having an opportunity to review the license may if it
chooses return the information and obtain a refund.8 3 Although
allowing an opportunity to return has been lauded by some as a
step forward for consumer protection, the objectors note that the
right of return is of questionable value: the right of return can be
easily obviated by the licensor who makes the information availa-
ble ahead of time by posting it on the website,84 thus ignoring the
fact that the terms are non-negotiable and unread; the right does
not apply if the new terms are construed as proposed modification
of terms;8 5 and most users or licensees never read the terms in the
license anyway. Even if they read the term, the term at the time of
acquisition may not seem sufficiently important to merit a return;
the costs invested in the deal to date may be great; and transaction
costs (time, aggravation, replacement) are not covered.
The only policing mechanism is that of unconscionability. The second method, dis-
cussed below, deals only with terms that come after the obligation to pay.
82. UCITA § 111. There has been a continuing argument about whether the
unconscionability concept found in UCC section 2-302 gives sufficient protection
against onerous terms in adhesion contracts. As a result, the 1999 Article 2 An-
nual Meeting Draft contained the following addition to section 2-302, which was
approved by a 2-1 margin:
(b) In a consumer contract, a nonnegotiated term in a standard form re-
cord is unconscionable and is not enforceable if it
(1) eliminates the essential purpose of the contract;
(2) subject to Section 2-202, conflicts with other material terms to
which the parties have expressly agreed; or
(3) imposes manifestly unreasonable risk or cost on the consumer in
the circumstances. Id.
When the 1999 Annual Meeting Draft was withdrawn from consideration, the pro-
vision was abandoned and not carried over by the new Drafting Committee into
what are now the 2001 Amendments to the Article 2, in large part because of the
organized opposition of industry. See Speidel, Trenches, supra note 12. Thus, the
question of policing standard terms in adhesion contracts has been left to the
courts on a case-by-case basis.
83. UCITA § 112 (explaining that a person can manifest assent to a term or
record only if he or she has had an opportunity to review its terms, which in the
case of terms coming after the obligation to pay arises, means only if the person
has a right to a return if he or she rejects the term). This concept is further elabo-
rated in the case of mass market licenses in UCITA section 209.
84. UCITA §§ 112, 212 (if there is pre-transaction disclosures of contract
terms in Internet transactions where the contract is formed online for an electronic
delivery of information then an opportunity to review is deemed given).
85. Id. § 112.
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Again, these types of provisions must be examined against in-
ternational concepts of appropriate policing tools, where the con-
cept of policing against unfairness is seen as a business issue as
much as a consumer issue. 86 The most relevant provision laid out
in the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Con-
tracts allows a court to set aside a term in a standard form if it is
"of such a character that the other party could not reasonably have
expected it .... 87 Ironically, this formulation, which the
UNIDROIT Principles apply to commercial contracts, was rejected
by the UCITA drafting committee as too liberal, even in the con-
sumer context. Other international documents give additional
powers to courts to police transactions in the consumer context,
powers going well beyond the UNIDROIT rules.88
The combination of the assent rules of UCITA (which find a
binding agreement at the slightest click of a mouse) and the polic-
ing rules which do not give adequate oversight against overreach-
ing led to passage of the following sense-of-the-house motion at the
1998 ALI Annual Meeting discussion on Article 2B (UCITA's pre-
cursor): "The current draft of proposed UCC Article 2B has not
reached an acceptable balance in its provisions concerning assent
to standard form records [§§2B-111, 2B-203, 2B-207, 2B-208, and
2B-3041 and should be returned to the Drafting Committee for fun-
damental revision of the several related sections governing as-
sent."8 9 Of course, membership of the ALI never evaluated the
final act (renamed UCITA) against this motion to police compli-
ance with its wishes as a result of the disengagement of the ALI
from the process in the spring of 1999.
86. See Michael J. Bonell, An International Restatement of Contract Law: The
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 90 (Rome, 1994).
An optimistic assumption that long prevailed at both domestic and inter-
national level was that contracts between merchants are concluded only
by experienced and competent professionals in acting in accordance with
well-established principles of fair dealing .... This assumption is in-
creasingly being questioned ... the UNIDROIT Principles move from a
more realistic evaluation of international commercial bargains and pro-
vide a variety of means for 'policing' the contract or its terms against both
procedural and substantive unfairness.
Id.
87. UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (1994), art.
2.20(1), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/pr-main.htm.
88. See infra notes 93-104.
89. Braucher & Linzer, supra note 26.
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Consumer Transactions
The third area of controversy with potential relevance to the
CISG debate involves coverage of consumer transactions within
the CISG. The need to cover consumer as well as commercial
transactions under one international legal rubric stems from an
important feature of electronic commerce: on the Internet, the re-
tail and wholesale markets converge, and the ability to distinguish
between consumers and merchants diminishes. Were the CISG to
cover consumer transactions, there would undoubtedly be both the
risk that the CISG would undermine existing consumer protection
under national laws, and the risk that pressure would be brought
in the revision process to deal with consumer protection in the con-
vention itself (a very difficult task given the disparate nature of
consumer protection regimes around the world). In the drafting of
UCITA, consumer protection was a significant area of concern,90
sparking opposition by, among others, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion and the National Association of Attorneys General.91 For ex-
ample, the failure of UCITA to deal with such matters as prior
online disclosure of terms has been criticized as a failure to recog-
nize applicable norms in consumer protection. 92
90. See, e.g., Ajay Ayyappan, UCITA: Uniformity at the Price of Fairness?, 69
Fordham L. Rev. 2471 (2001) (discussing the warranty provisions of UCITA and
their impact on fairness); Christopher T. Poggi, Electronic Commerce Legislation:
An Analysis of European and American Approaches to Contract Formation, 41 Va.
J. Int'l L. 224 (2000) (urging efforts to develop international conventions on elec-
tronic commerce, particularly in the consumer area, but noting that U.S. proposals
such as UCITA are "far from uncontroversial"); Michael L. Rustad, Making UCITA
More Consumer-Friendly, 18 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 547, 581 (1999)
("If UCITA is to serve as an international template for licensing software, [it]
should at least incorporate some additional consumer protections."); Saami Zain,
Regulation of E-Commerce by Contract: Is It Fair to Consumers, 31 UWLA L. Rev.
163 (2000) (examining deficiencies in contractual approach, and in UCITA, with
regard to consumer concerns in e-commerce).
91. See Letter from State Attorneys General to Gene N. Labrun, supra note
18.
92. O'Rourke, supra note 73, at 653.
Over the years, federal and non-uniform state enactments in the con-
sumer protection area effectively either preempted or modified parts of
Article 2, reflecting emerging views of relevant differences between busi-
ness-to-business transactions and business-to-consumer transactions. Ar-
ticle 2B has the opportunity to incorporate consumer protection into its
text, avoiding the later preemption that characterized Article 2.
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Traditional contract law, in the United States and other juris-
dictions, has developed doctrines that allow courts to set aside con-
tracts, in whole or in part, if their terms (or one of their terms) are
objectionable. Outside the United States, the law appears to be
more protective against the application of unfair contract terms.
The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts
is a prime example, barring the enforceability of terms in standard
form contracts that are both unreasonable and "surprising."93 It is
noteworthy that the UNIDROIT Principles are not consumer pro-
tection principles; by their own terms, the Principles apply only to
commercial contracts. 94 Yet, this formulation for governing terms
in standard form contract was rejected during the drafting of
UCITA (and the revisions to Article 2 as well).95
The European Union has enacted two regulations that give ad-
ded protection to consumers, protection not similarly afforded in
UCITA. The EU Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Con-
tracts deals with unfair terms in sales contracts with a consumer
buyer. Under that Directive, a term is unfair if (i) it has not been
individually negotiated;96 and (ii) it causes a significant imbalance
in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, to
the detriment of the consumer.97 The annex to the directive lists
some terms that are prima facie unfair, including some terms os-
tensibly condoned by UCITA. 98 Terms must be in plain and intelli-
93. See supra note 87.
94. UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (1994), Pre-
amble, available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/princ.htm#NRl
(last visited Nov. 17, 2001) ("These Principles set forth general rules for interna-
tional commercial contracts. They shall be applied when the parties have agreed
that their contract be governed by them.").
95. See, e.g., Speidel, Trenches, supra note 12; Rusch, supra note 12.
96. Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 Apr. 1993 on Unfair Terms of Consumer
Contracts, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29, art. 3.2 ("A term shall always be regarded as not
individually negotiated where it has been drafted in advance and the consumer
has therefore not been able to influence the substance of the term, particularly in
the context of pre-formulated standard contract.").
97. Id. at art. 4 ("[TIhe unfairness of a contractual term shall be assessed,
taking into account the nature of the goods or services for which the contract was
concluded and by referring, at the time of conclusion of the contract, to all the
circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract . . ").
98. Examples of possibly unfair terms under the Directive potentially conflict-
ing with UCITA include: inappropriate exclusions or limitations on a consumer's
remedies against the seller or supplier, including a right of offset granted the seller
(Annex 1(b)); terms requiring a breaching consumer to pay a disproportionately
high sum in compensation (Annex 1(e)); terms allowing the seller to terminate a
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gible language. 99 Furthermore, where there is doubt about the
meaning of a term, the interpretation most favorable to the con-
sumer shall prevail.100 The European Directive on Distance Sell-
ing Contracts grants certain substantive safeguards in "distance
contracts."10 These safeguards include requiring certain disclo-
sures prior to formation, in addition to granting consumers a
seven-day unilateral right to withdraw. l0 2 Choice of law clauses
which deny consumers the benefit of such rights are suspect.' 03
Other attempts to protect consumers against overreaching in adhe-
sion contract situations have been proposed in Europe. 10 4 Any at-
contract of indefinite duration without reasonable notice except where there are
serious grounds for doing so (Annex 1(g)); terms irrevocably binding the consumer
to terms with which he had no real opportunity of becoming acquainted before the
conclusion of the contract (Annex 1(i)); and terms allowing the supplier to unilater-
ally change the terms of the contract without a valid reason specified in the con-
tract (Annex l(j)).
99. Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 Apr. 1993 on Unfair Terms of Consumer
Contracts, supra note 96, at art. 5 (stating "where all or certain terms offered to
the consumer are in writing, these terms must always be drafted in plain, intelligi-
ble language").
100. Id.
101. Council Directive 97/7/EC of 20 May 1997 on the Protection of Consumers
in Respect of Distance Contracts, 1997 O.J. (L 144) 19. A distance contract means
any goods or services contract "concluded between a supplier and a consumer
under an organized distance sale . . . scheme run by the supplier, who, for the
purpose of the contract, makes exclusive use of one or more means of distance
communication" prior to contract creation. Id. at art. 2(1). This would include con-
tracts created by e-mail as well as those concluded electronically.
102. Id. at arts. 4-6.
103. Id. at art. 12.
Member States shall take the measures needed to ensure that the con-
sumer does not lose the protection granted by this Directive by virtue of
the choice of the law of a non-member country as the law applicable to the
contract if the latter has close connection with the territory of one or more
Member States.
Id.
104. In a recent letter to Parliament, the Dutch Minister of Justice suggested
introducing so called "unwaivable use rights" in order to expressly protect informa-
tion consumers against unconscionable licensing practices. Hugenholtz, supra
note 78, at 83 n.27; see also Francois Dessemontet, The European Approach to E-
Commerce and Licensing, 26 Brook. J. Int'l L. 59, 68 (2000) ("[Trhe French Conseil
d'Etat has suggested that a hyperlink be created so that the professional codes of
conduct be embodied as General Terms and Conditions of the contract .... Such a
renewed confidence in General Terms and Conditions could allow for the European
Law and the U.S. self-regulatory approach to converge to a larger extent.") Argu-
ments made during the UCITA drafting process, however, that certain terms (e.g.,
choice of law rules) should be "non-waivable" in mass market licenses were
rejected.
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tempts to enlarge the scope of the CISG, or to draft another
international instrument dealing with both commercial and con-
sumer transactions, will need to come to terms with these norms,
which are broadly accepted in major trading nations.
C. UCITA as an International Uniform Act
An alternative to enlarging the scope of the CISG to accommo-
date software or information contracts is to follow the UCITA pre-
cedent and develop an international uniform law dealing with such
transactions. Again, if such an effort were undertaken, there is
much to learn from UCITA and the discussions surrounding its
drafting and adoption. It is highly unlikely, however, that UCITA
would ever be found amenable to wholesale adoption on the inter-
national level. 1°5
Structural Issues
There are a number of observations (both general and specific)
that support this conclusion. First, some say a picture is worth a
thousand words. Picture a draft 261 single-spaced pages long (or
123,829 words), consisting of eight parts with a total of one-hun-
dred four (104) substantive provisions. 10 6 Its sheer length and
complexity makes UCITA a difficult act to understand, even for
those who are familiar with its provisions. Additionally, the tech-
nical nature of much of the material and the detailed definitions
(66 in total-many with substantive rules in the definitions) com-
bine to make reading and understanding the act a challenge. Com-
pounding the problem is the drafting style that is often
impenetrable, even for those familiar with UCITA. An example is
section 601(d): "Except as otherwise provided in section 603 and
604, in the case of a performance with respect to a copy, this sec-
tion is subject to sections 606 through 610 and sections 704
through 707."107
105. A forthcoming German book examines the appropriateness (or inappropri-
ateness) of the UCITA model under German law, considering such areas as war-
ranties, choice of law, and formation. Der E-Commerce Vertrag nach US Recht-
eine Einfhrung in den Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act (UCITA)
unter Bercksichtigung der Auswirkungen auf das Vertragsrecht fr IT Produkte
(Otto Schmidt Verlag, forthcoming 2002).
106. If one considers the transition rules as well, there are 109 provisions in
nine parts.
107. UCITA § 601(d).
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There are two factors that contributed to the long, comprehen-
sive nature of the UCITA draft, which has ambitiously tried to
cover virtually every issue raised during the drafting process. Al-
though the original project set out only to cover software, and
UCITA, as finalized, covers only computer information transac-
tions, drafts during the intervening stages were much broader in
scope, covering all transactions in information.' 08 This broad
scope brought a wide variety of industries to the drafting table, all
with their own agendas and issues; many provisions were incorpo-
rated into the final draft in an attempt to build support for the
Act.'0 9 When the scope was narrowed, many of these provisions
were left in. 110 Even with its narrowed scope, however, there are
those who have pointed out that the multiplicity of types of trans-
actions covered by UCITA (ranging from off-the-shelf purchases of
software, to access contracts, to contracts and to design software or
databases) makes a "one size fits all" strategy unworkable."' "The
net result is that (UCITA), in trying to be all things to all types of
computer transactions, has reached a level of complexity that is at
odds with ... [the] goals of simplicity and clarification."112
A second factor contributing to the length and complexity was
the desire to include provisions that were deemed essential to "sell"
UCITA to legislatures and others. One such set of provisions are
those dealing with contracting electronically (e.g., using electronic
108. See Pamela Samuelson & Kurt Opsahl, How Tensions Between Intellectual
Property Policy and UCITA Are Likely to be Resolved, in Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series 741, 747 (1999) ("Ini-
tially only software was involved, but then on-line databases came onboard, fol-
lowed by digital information products and services such as CD-ROMs. By 1995,
the scope of the proposed law . .. had expanded to cover information licensing
generally.").
109. There was a second tendency that arose when an industry raised substan-
tial objections to the draft: eliminate them from the act's coverage. See UCITA
§ 103(d) (excluding, inter alia, financial services transactions; insurance services
transactions; motion picture or audio or visual programming; sound recordings,
musical works, or phonorecords; and telecommunications products or services).
110. UCITA has been analogized to a huge Christmas tree with ornaments for
every possible industry; the problem is that when the scope was changed and the
Christmas tree was cut back, the number of ornaments remained the same.
111. See O'Rourke, supra note 73, at 648 (noting to the extent that the product
consists of a bundle of rights granted under a license, the contract and not any
objective tangible characteristics defines the product; the result is that a change in
contract terms changes the product and results in a multiplicity of types of
contracts).
112. Id. at 647.
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mail or the Internet).113 Ironically, at the same time UCITA was
being drafted, the National Conference was working on a separate
product-the Uniform Electronic Transactions ActL14-covering
precisely those issues: electronic contracting. Questions were re-
peatedly raised during the drafting process about the need to in-
clude such provisions in UCITA in light of this separate
Conference product; 115 the justification articulated for keeping
these provisions in UCITA was that it would be better for those
under UCITA to have all contracting rules included in one place. A
more likely explanation for the reticence to remove these provi-
sions is that these were exactly the types of provisions being
sought by many major industries seeking certainty regarding the
enforceability of electronic contracts. By including these needed
provisions, the hope was that those doing electronic contracting
would support the draft as a whole. 116 The importance of these
113. By contrast, those developing other types of e-commerce legislation found
it important to distinguish between the rules governing electronic contracting in
general, and the substantive rules governing the underlying transaction. Thus,
the UNCITAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce and the Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act focus solely on the use of an electronic medium to contract and do
not attempt to combine those issues with the substantive ones. See also O'Rourke,
supra note 73, at 648 (noting that the unifying factor in the European E-Commerce
Directive was the means of contracting rather than the subject matter of the con-
tract, and suggesting that UCITA might "benefit from some synthesis" with the
Commission Directive).
114. The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) was adopted by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in August of 1999.
The full text of the act, with comments, is available at http:/www.law.upenn.edu/
bll/ulc/fnact99/1990s/ ueta99.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2001). As of September
2001, the UETA had been enacted in 38 states. Up-to-date information on the
enactment status of the UETA may be found at http://www.nccusl.org/
uniformact_factsheetluniformacts-fs-ueta.asp.
115. Indeed, the ALI was one of those questioning the need for those
provisions.
116. There are those who have cynically observed that most people are una-
ware of the distinctions between UCITA and UETA, frequently confusing the two,
and that those who have indicated support for the former may well have only in-
tended to support the latter! There are undoubtedly substantive reasons why the
UCITA Drafting Committee wanted to retain its electronic contracting provisions.
By comparison to the UETA drafting committee, the UCITA Drafting Committee
was in favor of detailed rules that would strengthen the ability of parties (e.g.,
licensors) to enforce electronic contracts. See Amelia H. Boss, Searching for Secur-
ity in the Law of Electronic Commerce, 23 Nova L. Rev. 585 (1999). Thus, UCITA's
proposed rules on attribution were more detailed and directive than the corre-
sponding provisions in the UETA. Ultimately, however, UETA's formulation pre-
vailed and was adopted for UCITA on the floor of the National Conference.
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electronic contracting provisions is illustrated by the argument re-
peatedly made during the drafting process that UCITA needed to
be finished quickly to avoid federal preemption. 117 The only major
threat of preemption from inaction was in the field of electronic
contracting, and that was realized with the passage of the federal
E-Sign legislation.""
The exceptional detail in UCITA is a substantial barrier to its
utility on the international level. Even if such detail might be war-
ranted in the United States, for domestic and legislative purposes,
it would be difficult to reach consensus on such technical matters
internationally, given the divergent legal systems that need to be
accommodated. Moreover, many of the provisions of UCITA were
written against the backdrop of U.S. law, 119 and the resulting
rules may not be consistent with other legal systems.
In addition, UCITA was built against a backdrop of existing
trade usages and practices-usages and practices that may not be
representative of those occurring on the international level, or in-
dicative of those that may exist in the future. Indeed, one of the
persistent questions raised about UCITA is whether, even within
the United States, industry practice is sufficiently established to
justify codification. 120 One of the reasons given for the decision to
abandon attempts to include information within the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (Article 2B) and to proceed with a uniform law
outside the Code was that the industry was sufficiently in flux that
117. This argument was made frequently by the Article 2B Reporter and Draft-
ing Committee Chair during presentations to both the ALI and the National
Conference.
118. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000, 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 7001-07 (2001). Ironically, the passage of UCITA has spurred some
pressure to respond with federal legislation or regulation preempting UCITA pro-
visions, at least in the consumer area. See, e.g., supra note 22.
119. For example, the provisions on informational content (which were not un-
controversial) were drafted against the backdrop of the United States Constitution
and its protection of free speech.
120. See O'Rourke, supra note 73, at 651 ("In many industries which would be
governed by [UCITA], it is premature to refer to a usage of trade. Customs are
rapidly evolving, and deference to a particular norm at a particular time may not
be appropriate."). Additionally, the technologies themselves are still rapidly
changing. See A. Michael Froomkin, Article 2B as Legal Software for Electronic
Contracting- Operating System or Trojan Horse?, 13 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1023,
1026 (1998) ("One reason why Article 2B [and UCITA have] proven to be so diffi-
cult to get right is that the information technologies to which [they] would apply
are themselves in a state of ferment.").
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it would be premature to include it within the Code. This same
reasoning may well justify not proceeding with it at all, domesti-
cally or internationally, at this time.121
It should be noted that, on an international level, not all con-
cepts included in UCITA may be necessary or desirable. To the
extent UCITA purports to cover electronic contracting, for exam-
ple, much of it may be unnecessary in light of products such as the
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce or the UNCI-
TRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures. More importantly, as
noted earlier, many of the concepts of UCITA may be inconsistent
with international standards. Much of the consumer treatment,
for example, must be considered in light of international norms
such as those evolving within the OECD. 122
Collision With Intellectual Property
Probably the greatest obstacle to the wholesale adoption of
UCITA internationally is its intrusion into the area of intellectual
property. Although UCITA purports to be simply a "contracting"
statute rather than an "intellectual property" regime, 123 one of the
big areas of controversy in the United States is the intersection of
UCITA and its validation of licensing on intellectual property re-
gimes. 124 The relationship of licensing to intellectual property law
is a complex one. 125 Although some have argued that a license is
merely an agreement of the licensor not to sue for any violation of
its intellectual property rights (and therefore merely supports the
existing intellectual property regime), modern licensing schemes
go much further: licensors use licenses to get more than they are
granted by intellectual property law by increasing the sanctions
against licensees for violation of that law; by placing limitations on
121. Commercial law tends to be descriptive or enabling rather than norma-
tive; until there is something to describe, it is difficult to legislate.
122. See OECD, supra note 77 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., Nimmer, Looking Glass, supra note 9, at 304 ("UCITA deals with
contracts and not property rights.").
124. Hugenholtz, supra note 78, at 78-79; Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, UCITA in the
International Marketplace: Are We About to Export Bad Innovation Policy?, 26
Brook. J. Intl L. 49, 52-53 (2000) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, Marketplace]; Rochelle C.
Dreyfuss, Do You Want to Know a Trade Secret? Licensing Under Article 2B of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 1193 (1999) [hereinafter Dreyfuss,
Trade Secret].
125. A full exploration of that relationship is beyond the scope of this article.
For a glimpse into the problem, see Rice, supra note 11.
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the rights granted to licensees by applicable intellectual property
law (e.g., on users' rights in or use of the information or by avoid-
ing the first sale doctrine);126 and by creating limitations on use of
information that is not even protected by intellectual property law
(e.g., non-copyrightable information). 127 In addition, to get even
more protection than is given under applicable intellectual prop-
erty law and contract law, licensors have sought the technological
ability to restrict the use of information (both copyrighted and non-
copyrighted), legislative authorization of these technological
means, 128 and legislative penalization of those who attempt to cir-
cumvent those technological means. 129 These efforts have been
criticized both on the basis of conflicts with intellectual property
policy and competition policy. 380
126. See David A. Rice, Licensing the Use of Computer Program Copies and the
Copyright Act First Sale Doctrine, 30 Jurimetrics J. 157 (1990); Mark A. Lemley,
Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1239 (1999).
127. See generally ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (in-
volving a license in a non-copyrightable compilation of telephone numbers).
128. See, e.g., World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, art.
11, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65, 71; Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17
U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. IV 1998).
129. See, e.g., Council Directive 01/29/EC of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation
of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society,
2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, art. 6. [hereinafter European Copyright Directive], available
at http-//europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/_167/_16720010622en00100019.
pdf. The proposed Copyright Directive implementing the WIPO Copyright Treaty
contains a provision prohibiting acts of circumvention and also the manufacturing
and selling of equipment suitable for that purpose. See also Council Directive 91/
250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 1991 O.J.
(L 122) 42, art. 7(1)(c) (containing earlier recognition of protection of technological
means) [hereinafter Software Directive], available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/
en/lif/dat/1991/en_391L0250.html.
130. The use restrictions and restrictions on assignability are particularly egre-
gious to some. As one writer has noted:
Software publishers expanded copy-use licensing objectives from protec-
tion against copying to shielding their programs from product-line compe-
tition, regulating development of interoperable products, and protecting
information content not protected by copyright. Other use and transfer
restrictions are employed to differentiate, and thereby price discriminate
between, user markets .... [and] foreclose the development of product
resale or system maintenance competition.
Rice, supra note 11, at 281; but see Dessomentet, supra note 104, at 75 ("The very
existence of a well-developed body of unfair competition law supplementing the
unavoidable loopholes of the statutory intellectual property rights prevents
Europeans from viewing the legislative protection of IP rights as an implicit exclu-
sion of all other protection by means of contractual rights.").
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It is in this light that the suitability of the UCITA provisions
must be examined. The debates about what type of intellectual
property protection is appropriate, particularly in an electronic en-
vironment, have been occurring on an international as well as a
domestic basis. UCITA has a direct effect on that debate, since
UCITA allows individual licensors to "preempt" that debate
through licensing.
First, of course, it is necessary to determine under existing law
those rights that cannot be changed by contract. European legisla-
tion grants certain rights to copyright users, for example, that do
not depend upon contract for their existence. Four are included in
the European Software Directive: 131 (i) the right to make a back-up
copy; 132 (ii) the right to observe, test or study a computer pro-
gram;133 (iii) the right to test for error correction;' 34 and (iv) the
right to "decompile" or reverse engineer. 135 The Software Direc-
tive, however, is silent on whether these limits may be waived or
varied by contract. Rights under the European Database Directive
include the right to perform acts inherent to normal usage,'3 6 and
the right to re-utilize substantive parts of a database. 137 Simi-
larly, the law of other countries, in setting out the intellectual
property balance of that regime, may give licensees of information
certain use and other rights that may not be varied by contract. 138
However, an examination of these rights, and the extent to which
they are mandatory, is only the beginning of the analysis.' 3 9
131. Software Directive, supra note 129.
132. Id. at art. 5(2). That right "may not be prevented by contract insofar as it
is necessary for that use." Id.
133. Id. at arts. 5(3), 9(1).
134. Id. at art. 5(1).
135. Id. at arts. 6, 9(1).
136. Council Directive 96/9/EC of 11 Mar. 1996 on the Legal Protection of
Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20, art. 6(1) [hereinafter Database Directive], availa-
ble at http://europa.eu.intlindex-en.htm.
137. Id. at art. 8 (noting that the right may not be overridden).
138. See, e.g., Murumba, supra note 70, at 107 (discussing such issues under
Australian law and the use of licenses "to destroy the delicate balance between the
private and public domains that copyright in particular, and intellectual property
in general, have maintained over the years").
139. UCITA recognizes that some of its provisions may be preempted by federal
law such as copyright; if federal law invalidates a contract term, then federal law
controls. It further recognizes that a license provision may be unenforceable be-
cause it contravenes fundamental public policy "to the extent that the interest in
enforcement is clearly outweighed by a public policy against enforcement of the
term." UCITA § 105. Provisions such as these avoid, rather than confront, the
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The second and larger question is what the appropriate frame-
work should be for protection of rights in data. As Professor
Rochelle Dreyfus has noted, there is a balance struck in every in-
tellectual property scheme proposed (copyright, trademark, pat-
ent): the right of the creator inventor to exploit and the right of the
public to use.140 Of course, the balance struck in the United States
is not necessarily the same as the balance struck in other coun-
tries: the inability to reach international consensus on appropriate
international intellectual property schemes raises the possibility of
similar difficulties in attempts to reach international consensus on
appropriate private contractual schemes controlling the right to
use information. UCITA is one-sided to the extent that it allows
licensors of information to change that balance, i.e., by allowing a
creator of information to tie up that information longer, or for more
uses, than would be allowed by IP law, without recognition of the
public domain and its importance:
Each [intellectual property] regime premised is around leaks.
Each depends upon information being private for long enough
for the creators to earn a profit, but then each permits the
information to leak-drip-into a place where the public can
use it freely. UCITA, in contrast, finds every hole, and then
either plugs it or allows the contracting parties to plug it.
Under UCITA, a licensor can "take out" a licensee-put a li-
censee out of competition in the licensor's creative market for-
ever. A licensor can bar fair use, reverse engineering, follow-
on inventions, and new applications. The licensor can require
grantbacks, tie ins and tie outs. What is more, UCITA is very
efficient. It facilitates mass market contracts, and it makes
sure those restrictions are imposed on successive licensees
and remote purchasers, even when those purchasers are not
aware of what they are letting themselves in for.... In the
final analysis, what UCITA does is this: in the name of pro-
moting exploitation of this generation of works, it hobbles fu-
ture generations of creators. 141
The acceptability of such provisions internationally is far from
clear. As one commentator observed: "from a European perspec-
more critical issues of what those laws or policies should be-which is of course the
subject of the ongoing intellectual property law debates. Query whether it is not
better to get the balance right at the outset, rather than to depend upon an exter-
nal body of law to draw the limits on enforceability.
140. Dreyfuss, Marketplace, supra note 124.
141. Id. at 52-53.
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tive,... [tihe combination of contract and technology poses a direct
threat to the copyright system as we know it, and may require an
entierly new body of information law to safeguard the public do-
main."142 On the other hand, another commentator has noted that
"most of the European laws' limitations on copyright laws are not
mandatory in my view: licensors and licensees can establish their
own regulations for themselves, disregarding the limitation to the
copyright that benefit all people not bound by contract." 43
Whether or not one ultimately agrees with these observations,
the point is that adoption of UCITA-like principles on the interna-
tional level without a full inquiry into the merits of such argu-
ments would be undesirable. Enactment of a uniform information
transaction code without a "coherent, integral information pol-
icy"-or at least without consideration of such a policy-would be
dangerous.' 44
Other Substantive Issues
There are, of course, controversial provisions within UCITA
that will have special significance on the international level. For
example, "hidden" within the lengthy act are two provisions of
profound consequence for all transactions: those addressing choice
of law and choice of forum issues.145 Again, the expansive grant of
party autonomy in these areas, and whether those rules are appro-
priate, is the subject of much ongoing debate-both within the con-
text of UCITA146 and on a more generalized basis as well. 147
142. See Hugenholtz, supra note 78, at 78-79 (footnote omitted).
143. Dessemontet, supra note 104, at 76.
144. Dreyfus, Marketplace, supra note 124; see also Murumba, supra note 70,
at 92.
Although they effect fundamental changes, these legislative initiatives
are sometimes characterized as just an effort to systematize or recon-
figure transactional law into a form useable in the digital environment,
but the vigorous worldwide debate which has surrounded these initia-
tives--especially UCITA-indicates that there is much more at stake here
than mere systematization or adaptation .... [What] is at stake is no less
than the very foundations of an emerging law of the digital domain. In
the context of software licensing, that law consists of three interlocking
components: contract, intellectual property, and increasingly, the law-like
architectural features and protocols of that domain.
Id.
145. UCITA §§ 109, 110.
146. See, e.g., Amos Shapiro, Territorialism, National Parochialism, Universal-
ism and Party Autonomy: How Does One Square the Choice-of-Law Circle?, 26
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Obviously, before such rules are raised to the international level, it
is necessary to examine their consistency with other law,148 such
Brook. J. Int'l L. 199, 205 (2000) (noting that "a choice-of-law methodology that
aspires to promote the idea of objective fair notice ought to refrain from designat-
ing as applicable a system of law that clearly has no appropriate relationship with
a party to the litigation"); William J. Woodward, Jr., Contractual Choice of Law:
Legislative Choice in an Era of Party Autonomy, 54 SMU L. Rev. 697 (2001). At
least one author appears to believe that in the case of applicable law, uniformity is
nigh impossible. Ted Janger, Jurisdictional Competition and the Dim Prospects
for Uniformity, 26 Brook. J. Int'l L. 187, 196 (2000).
Thus a law of the licensor rule is unlikely to become a uniform choice-of-
law rule under either a decentralized or uniform law approach, and is
likely to create an incentive towards a substantive race to the bottom if it
is adopted as a mandatory rule of international law. [The] law of the i-
censee rule would not appear to solve the problem. The same pressures
that would likely defeat uniform adoption of a UCITA type rule would
work in reverse with regard to a law of the licensee rule.
Id.
At the 1997 meeting, discussions on choice of law were curtailed when the
Reporter agreed to reexamine whether the parties to a contract may choose the law
of a jurisdiction with no connection to the transaction as the law governing the
transaction, as well as the issue of what constitutes a manifestation of assent to
the law of a given jurisdiction. At the 1998 ALI Annual Meeting discussing Article
2B, the membership appeared to be equally divided over a sense-of-the-house mo-
tion to delete this subsection and the choice of law provisions in their entirety,
leaving the issue of the UCC's contractual choice-of-law provision to be resolved by
the Article 1 Drafting Committee. The decision of the ALI to withdraw from the
process precluded any further ALI action on these provisions.
147. The changes to the choice of law provisions contained in proposed revi-
sions to Article 1 of the Uniform Commercial Code have provoked a great deal of
discussion. See Woodward, supra note 146; Fred H. Miller, Intrastate Choice of
Applicable Law in the UCC, 54 SMU L. Rev. 525 (2001); Amelia H. Boss, The Ju-
risdiction of Commercial Law: Party Autonomy in Choosing Applicable Law and
Forum under Proposed Revisions to the Uniform Commercial Code, 32 Int'l Law.
1067 (1998); Kathleen Patchel, Choice of Law and Software Licenses: A Framework
for Discussion, 26 Brook J. Int'l L. 117 (2000).
148, One particular aspect of the choice of law rule bears special note: the dif-
ferentiation between the law of jurisdictions inside and outside the United States.
Under UCITA, if the laws of a country outside the United States apply as a result
of the choice of law provisions, that law governs only if it provides substantially
similar protections and rights to a party not located in that jurisdiction as are
provided under UCITA. UCITA § 109(c). Significantly, this rule applies only if
there is no contract choice of law provision: the theory being that the parties (in-
cluding consumers) can agree to give up the protections they would otherwise be
entitled to. To the extent that this provision demonstrates a "U.S.-centric" provi-
sion, its propriety on an international basis is extremely questionable. A similar
problem exists in the proposed revisions to Article 1 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.
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as the Rome Convention which determines choice of law149 and the
1968 Brussels Convention on choice of forum, 150 and to examine
their propriety in light of international discussions such as those
currently taking place in the Hague. 15' Recognition of party au-
tonomy is taken to an even further extreme in UCITA's condona-
tion of a licensee's self-help rights, which calls into question the
propriety (from both a legal and policy perspective) of the use of
technological methods to replace both contract and intellectual
property law as a method of protecting a licensor's rights in
information.152
Despite the difficulties inherent in adopting UCITA as model
international legislation, UCITA is nonetheless useful as a guide
to future work in the field. Even the critics of UCITA recognize the
contributions that it has made to the development of the law,153
and many of UCITA's provisions deserve attention and study to
determine what can be learned from them. UCITA has succeeded
in identifying many of the electronic commerce issues that need
resolution, even if the solutions it proposes do not ultimately pre-
vail. In addition, UCITA has succeeded in formulating some more
general concepts that represent a step forward in the development
of the law. The challenge is to ferret out the good.
149. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, opened for
signature June 19, 1980, 1980 O.J. (L 266) 1.
150. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, 1978 O.J. (L 304) 77.
151. Hague Conference on Private International Law.
152. See generally Robbin Rahman, Electronic Self-help Repossession and You:
a Computer Software Vendor's Guide to Staying out of Jail, 48 Emory L.J. 1477
(1999); Craig Dolly, The Electronic Self-help Provisions of UCITA: A Virtual Repo
Man?, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 663 (2000). One of the arguments frequently ad-
vanced in favor of the self-help provisions is that self-help is already recognized in
the Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 provisions dealing with default; this is one
area where there is apparently a reluctance to admit that the issues involving elec-
tronics are sufficiently different to merit a different rule. See Hugenholtz, supra
note 78, at 78-79 ("The combination of contract and technology poses a direct
threat to the copyright system as we know it, and may require an entirely new
body of information law to guard the public domain.").
153. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, Marketplace, supra note 124, at 49 (while criticizing
UCITA, expresses enthusiasm for "a system along the lines" of UCITA-"a con-
tractual code facilitating information exchange, applicable uniformly throughout a
trading region.").
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One concept that originated in UCITA, that of a "mass mar-
ket" license, deserves particular study.154 In the past, much legis-
lation has distinguished between transactions based upon the
identity of the parties to the transaction: e.g., merchant versus
non-merchant' 55 or consumer versus merchant. UCITA, however,
recognizes that it may make sense to distinguish between transac-
tions based not on the identity of the parties, but on the nature of
the contracting process leading to the agreement. One should dis-
tinguish the execution from the concept of the mass market con-
tract: whether or not one agrees with the particulars of the
definition of the "mass market" license, or with the specifics of the
rules applicable to such a license, 156 the concept may become a use-
ful tool for future analysis.
A second example of an attempt in UCITA to deal with legiti-
mate issues is in the area of mistake. Although mistakes occur in
any environment and with regard to all kinds of subject matter,
UCITA recognizes that the possibility of mistake in an electronic
environment is sufficiently high and the costs of protecting against
such error relatively low so that legislative inducements to reduce
error and protect individuals may be appropriate. As a result,
UCITA contains a specific error correction procedure, 157 as does
the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act.' 58 Although there are
differences between the two formulations, 15 9 they both arguably go
beyond the more traditional rules of mistake found in United
States law or in European contract law.' 60 The need for error cor-
rection procedures has been acknowledged in the European E-
Commerce Directive, which mandates that each member state en-
154. See Holly K. Towle, Mass Market Transactions in the Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act, 38 Duq. L. Rev. 371 (2000).
155. This is the distinction adopted in Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.
156. See, e.g., Chow, supra note 51 (critiquing section 109's applicability to
mass market licenses). A frequent criticism of UCITA is the failure to recognize
that mass market licenses, to the extent that they are not negotiated and based on
true assent, may need special rules in such areas as choice of law and forum and
transferability restrictions. See Braucher, supra note 65, at 2.
157. UCITA § 214.
158. UETA § 10.
159. UCITA deals with consumers, the UETA with individuals. UCITA applies
if there has been an error in an electronic message created by a consumer using an
information processing system, whereas the UETA deals with both errors by the
individual and changes in the message occurring during transmission.
160. See Ramberg, supra note 34.
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sure that service providers make available "appropriate, effective
and accessible technical means allowing [the customer] to identify
and correct input errors, prior to the placing of the order."16 1 The
directive, however, simply mandates the presence of error correc-
tion procedures, but gives no remedy in the case of uncorrected er-
rors. UCITA, as well as the UETA, may help inform the debate on
these issues.162
III. THE BIGGER PICTURE
How does the UCITA experience fit into the broader frame-
work of law making? In many respects, that experience (and its
potential international component) raises the question of the na-
ture of law-making both domestically and internationally. At least
one European scholar has characterized the substantial failure of
the states to enact UCITA as a demonstration that the United
States "has not yet resolved to regulate by law, on a nation-wide
scale, the basic issues raised by contracting on the Net."163 Thus,
in the United States, common law will develop to respond to the
needs of electronic commerce, filling the gaps as need be. By con-
trast, the lack of any common law in many European and other
countries means that, if there is to be any body of law on electronic
commerce, it must be imposed by statute or be "regulatory." Thus,
161. Council Directive 00/31/EC of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of
Information Society Services, In Particular Electronic Commerce, In the Interna-
tional Market (Directive on Electronic Commerce), 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, art. 11.
The directive does allow, however, non-consumer parties to agree that such proce-
dures not be provided, and further exempts from the error correction procedures
"contracts concluded exclusively by exchange of electronic mail or by equivalent
individual communications." Thus, it appears to be geared primarily toward web-
based applications facilitating the placement of orders. Query whether, in the case
of a merchant buyer, the Directive would give effect to a provision in a click-wrap
agreement on the site waiving any rights to error correction procedures.
162. There are, of course, many other concepts in UCITA that merit study, such
as its concept of electronic agents. See, e.g., Ian R. Kerr, Spirits in a Material
World: Intelligent Agents as Intermediaries in Electronic Commerce, 22 Dalhousie
L.J. 188 (1999); Jean-Francois Lerouge, The Use of Electronic Agent Questioned
under Contractual Law: Suggested Solutions on a European and American Level,
18 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 403 (1999) (noting the need to address issues
raised by use of electronic agents in electronic commerce, particularly in the areas
of assent and mistake, but rejecting the UCITA approach and formulation); Ian R.
Kerr, Providing for Autonomous Electronic Devices in the Uniform Electronic Com-
merce Act, at http:J/www.ulcc.calen/cls/index.cfm?sec=4&sub=4f.
163. Dessemontet, supra note 104, at 61.
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arguably the need for a detailed statutory framework for electronic
commerce is greater in Europe than in the United States.
Yet most of its supporters would undoubtedly balk at charac-
terizing UCITA as "regulatory." UCITA proponents went to great
lengths to assure that, from their perspective, the resulting act
was not regulatory and resisted attempts to include provisions that
they had deemed regulatory in substance. 64 This apparent disa-
greement as to whether or not UCITA is "regulatory" reveals a far
more fundamental difference between UCITA and the type of legis-
lation one typically finds in civil law or European countries. In the
latter, legislation or regulation is most frequently aimed at putting
restrictions on what private parties may do, or mandating what
they must do. An example is the European Directive on Electronic
Commerce, which requires disclosures of prescribed information
and use of prescribed procedures in commercial transactions. 165
UCITA arguably represents a different perspective of an appropri-
ate legal framework for electronic commerce than one might find
internationally. 166 As one commentator noted:
By applying national law rather than some cyberspace law
that would of course be heavily influenced by U.S. law, we try
to keep some autonomy. By applying the consumer's law, we
apply European law in most cases where a U.S. supplier is
involved. But for how long can we check the advance of U.S.
notions of e-commerce? The question is moot. Legislative au-
tonomy is important inasmuch as it allows Europe to bargain
for fair terms and conditions when an international conven-
tion of some sort will be prepared. Legislative autonomy is
not an end in itself, but a means to reach a balanced solu-
tion-for contracting generally, for privacy, for intellectual
164. Ring, supra note 64, at 326-27.
165. See, e.g., Directive on Electronic Commerce, supra note 161, at art. 5 (re-
quired disclosures of information by service providers), art. 7 (restrictions on unso-
licited commercial communications) and art. 11 (mandating procedures to be
followed upon receipt of orders and mandating availability of error correction
procedures).
166. There are some that might argue that UCITA is an example of "private
rent-seeking" where private interests influence the lawmaking process to achieve
redistributive goals, e.g., licensors of software "dominate the rulemaking process
and impose on the rest of the world a set of rules that diminishes overall welfare
but that make licensors better off." Paul B. Stephen, Choice of Law and Its Conse-
quences: Constitutions for International Transactions, 26 Brook. J. Int'l L. 211, 215
(2000); see also lain Ramsay, The Politics of Commercial Law, 2001 Wis. L. Rev.
564.
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property protection and transactions, and for conflicts of
law.167
Despite this apparent conflict, there is a lot to be learned from
UCITA and the drafting experience. One view is that the process
is just beginning. There may be a lesson to learn here from the
UCC; it was initially completed by the National Conference and
the ALI in 1952, and Pennsylvania quickly became the first to en-
act it. Adoptions stopped, however, when the Code came under in-
tense scrutiny and attack, leading the drafters to abandon
enactment efforts and completely overhaul the Code, resulting in a
finally enactable version in 1958.168 It may well be time to sit back
and reflect on UCITA: its contributions, its controversies and its
criticisms. 169 It is time for the international community to criti-
cally scrutinize and (where appropriate) adopt and adapt provi-
sions from UCITA, allowing a symbiotic process to occur which
furthers the improvement and harmonization of law.170
167. Dessemontet, supra note 104, at 64.
168. For an interesting comparison of the drafting histories of both the UCC
and UCITA, see Thomas J. Murphy, It's Just Another Little Bit of History Repeat-
ing: UCITA in the Evolving Age of Information, 30 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 559
(2000).
169. See O'Rourke, supra note 73, at 657 ("The point is that [UCITA] should not
be abandoned. Rather, it should provide the basis for a national and international
discussion of how best to reconcile the sometimes conflicting goals of flexibility and
uniformity in the context of an overarching desire to encourage global electronic
commerce.").
170. Amelia H. Boss, Electronic Commerce and the Symbiotic Relationship Be-
tween International and Domestic Law Reform, 72 Tul. L. Rev. 1931 (1998) (ana-
lyzing the symbiotic process in the area of electronic signatures and electronic
records leading to the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce and the
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act).
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